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Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

WILLIAM S. LEWIS
Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

Introduction
Following the posthumous publication of the last philosophical
writings of Louis Althusser on the subject of “aleatory materialism” or, as
the philosophy developed in these writings is also known, “the materialism
of the encounter,” there has been a steady increase in the number of
thinkers engaging with these texts. Most have done so either to explain
them, to critique them, to apply them, or to compare them with other
theories of revolutionary politics. Scholarly engagement with these writings
attained perhaps its highest point with the publication of the collective
volumes Autour d’Althusser, Penser un matérialisme aléatoire in 2012 and
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Thought in 2013.
Almost twenty years after their first appearance in French and eight
years after their translation into English, there is now a large body of
secondary literature on the subject of aleatory materialism and we can begin
to categorize these responses. If we leave to one side the critiques of the
later Althusser which begin from a clearly anti-Marxist perspective as well as
those that search in Althusser’s philosophy for a key to his biography (and
in his biography a key to his philosophy) one can divide the responses
which take Althusser’s philosophy seriously into two categories. In the first
are those readings which maintain that Althusser achieved something of
importance with his classic works from the early 1960s and which also hold
that there may be something of interest in Althusser’s subsequent revision
of these ideas and arguments. However, these readings also assert that–at a
certain point–Althusser’s thoughts become inconsistent, contradictory, and
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of little philosophical or political value.1 The present essay will challenge
this position only indirectly, by suggesting that the difference between the
Althusser of 1965 and that of 1985 is more a question of rhetorical style and
of philosophical rigor than a question of philosophical content, depth,
consistency, or applicability. In the second category can be placed those
readings that take seriously Althusser’s philosophical work from the late
1970s and 1980s, who try to explain it, to apply its insights to political
questions, and who use ideas from these works to engage with other
political philosophies. Within the responses of this type, there is another
large division. On the one hand, there is a group of readings which maintain
that the importance of the philosophy of the encounter is due somewhat to
the fact that, with this philosophy, Althusser rejected the scientistic aspect
of his political philosophy and, instead, replaced it with a new ontology–a
materialism of the encounter–that could explain and justify a renewed
political practice.2 On the other hand, there are responses which take
seriously Althusser’s philosophical work from the 1980s but which also
maintain that there is a clear continuity between the Althusser of the 1970s–
who strongly argued that it is only by the methods of the sciences and
particularly by the methods of historical materialism that the political
conjuncture could be understood and a correct political line identified–and
the Althusser of the 1980s who seemed to hardly speak of these relations or
of this need.
The reading of Althusser that emphasizes the continuity of his
thought between 1960 (or even earlier) and 1987 is fast becoming the

1

Balibar, “Tais-toi, Althusser! (1988)”; Cangiani, “Althusser and the Critique of
Political Economy,” 245; Elliott, Althusser, 255–300; Elliott, “Postscript,” 74–75;
Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> – Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le
dernier Althusser.”
2 Badiou, “Can Change Be Thought? (interview),” 304.
2
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accepted one.3 However, within this consensus, the majority opinion is that,
in his last works, Althusser denies, rejects, or simply abandons the theory of
the relation he had previously specified as necessary between good scientific
knowledge and effective political action (where “effective” is defined as a
political action that secures and maintains a desired good). This denial of the
scientistic aspect of his project has had significant effects. The first
consequence is that it has served to obscure the importance of Althusser’s
arguments and theoretical innovations from the first half of the 1960s as
well as the significant revisions and developments these arguments and
concepts underwent between 1966 and 1978. The second consequence of
this reading is that it has helped establish an apparently clear connection
between Althusser and certain contemporary philosophers who look to
ontology in order to find a political direction and who tend to reject or
minimize the role played by the sciences in such a process. 4 A third
consequence is that it has encouraged or even justified the contemporary
retreat of Marxism into political theory (where it mostly competes in
theoretical space with other political theories) instead of into a scientific and
practical engagement with the socio-economic-political world and its
possibilities.
This essay will not challenge the forging of a connection between
Althusser and contemporary philosophers who look to ontology in order to
discover a revolutionary possibility, nor will it analyze specific instances of
this retreat into intramural theory. However, by demonstrating the

3

Boer, “Althusser’s Catholic Marxism”; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the
Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things”; Henninger, “Facticity and
Contingency in Louis Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism,” 37.
4 Those who follow this tendency wholly or partially include: Bryant, Srnicek, and
Harman, The Speculative Turn; Badiou, “Can Change Be Thought? (interview)”;
Diefenbach, “Althusser with Deleuze,” 179–180; Illas, “The Procrustean Bed of Class
Struggle,” 3; Johnston, “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with
Zizek”; Negri, “Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of Louis Althusser”; Toscano,
“Aleatory Rationalism”; Vatter, “Althusser et Machiavel.”
3
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correctness of the reading of Althusser which finds in his conception of the
relations between science, philosophy, and politics a continuity, it will
challenge those critics: (a) who wish to differentiate between an earlier,
scientistic Althusser and a later, ontological one; (b) who want to forge a
connection between Althusser and contemporary philosophers who look to
ontology in order to suggest a political direction; and (c) who overestimate
the role played by philosophy in understanding and encouraging
revolutionary transitions.
In order to show that the reading of Althusser which finds a
pronounced continuity in his conception of the relations among science,
philosophy, and politics is the correct one, this essay will begin with an
examination of Althusser’s “scientism.” The meaning of this term (one that
differs slightly from contemporary usages) will be specified before showing
how and in what way Althusser’s political philosophy between 1960 and
1980 can be described as “scientistic.” The next section will detail the
important political role Althusser assigned to the sciences and particularly to
the science of historical materialism during this period. This accomplished,
the arguments of interpreters who emphasize the apparent difference in
Althusser’s attitude towards science before and after 1980 will be
considered. Here, possible reasons for such a reading will be rehearsed .
Next, with the support of recently published and archival documents, this
essay will engage in a close and comparative reading of Althusser’s texts
from the 1970s and 1980s that have as their subject the relations among
philosophy, science, and politics. This survey will show the continuity in
Althusser’s position vis-à-vis the sciences: namely, that if we want good (i.e.
desired) socio-politico-economic changes to result from our political
actions, then it is necessary to engage in social scientific research or, at the
very least, to consult such research and to use this knowledge in our political
decision making. All this serves to support the conclusion that Althusser’s

4
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“new” political philosophy from the 1980s is not really so new. On the
contrary, his writings on the materialism of the encounter and aleatory
materialism represent prolongations and elaborations of positions and ideas
already developed in the 1960s and 1970s and that include a mostly
consistent understanding of the relations between scientific knowledge and
political action. This is true even if the rhetorical and philosophical style in
which these ideas are put forth in the 1980s differs from the ways in which
these ideas were introduced during the prior two decades.

1. Definition of Althusser’s Scientism
It is well known and often remarked upon by his critics that
Althusser’s work from the early 1960s until the end of the 1970s is
“scientistic” or that he was guilty of something called “scientism.”5 Almost
always, these remarks are pejorative.6 Those who levy this charge do so to
mark out Althusser as someone who reductively and wrongly appeals to the
methods of the natural or social sciences (or the knowledge produced by
these sciences) in order to understand an aspect of existence that the critic
believes might better be understood by other means.7 Sometimes, though,
the charge of scientism is meant to convey a slightly older but still utilized
sense of the term: namely, that Althusser holds the epistemological position
that all questions of knowledge and action are best answered by the
methods of the natural sciences and that the natural sciences on their own
can explain any and all phenomena. 8

5

Dosse, History of Structuralism. Vol. 1, 88–91; George, “Reading Althusser”;
Rancière, “Sur La Théorie de L’idéologie Politique d’Althusser,” 39; Wolin, The
Wind from the East, 120–121.
6 An exception is Amariglio, “Marxism against Economic Science,” 163.
7 Schöttler, “Scientisme sur l’histoire d’un concept difficile.”
8 Haack, “Six Signs of Scientism,” 77.
5
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Although Althusser certainly endorsed scientific practice during this
period as the best and most reliable way to produce knowledge about the
way our socio-economic relations are structured and intentionally
transformed, he did not believe that all questions of knowledge and action
are best answered by the methods of the natural sciences. 9 For instance, he
also argued that artistic and philosophical practice can produce critical
awareness of the world and that these practices may even occasion political
transformation.10 He also did not think that the natural sciences can explain
or give the truth of any phenomenon or that the social world and its history
can be explained wholly by appeal to the laws of the natural world. 11 He
believed even less that the social sciences could give us the truth of
ourselves, of our individual and collective natures, or of our future social
and economic arrangements.12 Therefore, his work does not exactly fit the
definition of scientism, at least according to the two most common
meanings of the term.
Despite the fact that Althusser’s work exactly fits neither of the
typical definitions of scientism, his philosophy was scientistic in this precise
respect: Althusser consistently argued that science is the only human
theoretical practice that allows us to reliably understand socio-politicoeconomic structures such that we might intentionally assist in their
transformation. Science, and more specifically the Marxist science of history,
historical materialism, can do so, he argued, because it allows us to
understand the origin of our ideological notions about what is good for
society and about what is to be done politically. It also allows us to critique
9

Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other
Essays, 105–109.
10 Althusser, “Cremonini, peintre de l’abstrait (1964-66)”; Althusser, “Sur Brecht et
Marx (1968)”; Bargu, “In the Theater of Politics”; Wilson, The Visual World of
French Theory.
11 Robert Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory (Berkeley
(Calif.): University of California Press, 1992), 195–201.
12 Althusser, “On Levi-Strauss.”
6
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these notions and to replace them with scientific understandings (principles)
of why we think and act the way we do. In turn, this knowledge allows us to
develop new plans for political actions, ones based on a critical and
scientific understanding of the actual processes at work in a particular
historical conjuncture and of its possible transformation.13 Unlike
ideological practice, which tends to the reproduction of existing socio economic relations, one of the most important things about historical
materialism for Althusser is that, once inaugurated, its practice tends to
replace existing ideas about our social and natural relations and to generate
new and politically reliable knowledge about the world. This new awareness
and this new knowledge of social relations is practical knowledge or
knowledge for practice. Insofar as it is correct, it allows us to change
ourselves and to change our world.

2. Althusser’s (mostly) consistent scientism: 1960-1980
Although it is part of the argument of this paper that Althusser’s
scientism was consistent between 1960 and 1980, this contention has not yet
13

Louis Althusser, “Théorie Marxiste et Parti Communiste>> (<<Union
théorie/pratique). 1966-1967,” 1967 1966, 12, Fonds Althusser, Institut Mémoires de
l’Édition Contemporaine. All translations are by the author of this paper. All
emphases (signified by italics) are Althusser’s.
Cette révolution théorique a permis ce qui était interdit aux anciennes
philosophies de l’histoire : la connaissance du type d’unité complexe existant
entre une société et ses idéologies. La science de l’histoire marxiste est en
effet une théorie qui rend compte de la structure d’une société, et donc en
même temps des “niveaux” ou “instances” distincts qui constituent cette
structure au niveau économique, mais aussi du niveau politique eu du niveau
idéologique. C’est l’existence de cette théorie qui permet à la connaissance
marxiste de courir à la fois la connaissance des fondements de la société
existante, ce que le socialisme utopique, suspendu en aveugle aux principes
idéologiques existants, est évidemment incapable de produire.
La théorie marxiste met ainsi en oeuvre ses principes scientifiques
dans 1/ la connaissance critique de la société existante 2/ la définition des fins
du socialisme 3/ la détermination des moyens d’action propres à faire la
révolution.
7
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been supported. It is important to provide an account of this position’s
consistency for three reasons. First, because this position is often neither
well explained nor well understood. Second, because it is unlikely that
someone who held such a position for two decades would suddenly
renounce it, the demonstration of this position’s longevity raises the burden
of proof for those who would argue that Althusser dropped the scientistic
aspects of his political philosophy in subsequent work. Third, detailing the
consistency of Althusser’s position over this time allows one to see the
evolution in his thought regarding the relations among philosophy, science,
and politics and, thereby, to better understand any changes to his view of
philosophy that may have precipitated a change in Althusser’s attitude
regarding the role of science in his political philosophy.
In an interview with the Mexican philosopher Fernanda Navarro that
took place near the end of his career, Althusser provided a brief
periodization of his thought. He distinguished these periods by the
definition of Marxist philosophy that characterized each one. During the
time that his most well-known or “classic” works were published (1960-65),
Althusser defined philosophy as “the theory of theoretical practice.” Only a
year or so after the appearance of For Marx and Reading Capital in 1965, he
revised his opinion and began arguing that “[Marxist] philosophy represents
politics with the sciences and scientificity with the practices.”14 Then, about
five years after this understanding of philosophy was promulgated (1972),
Althusser replaced it with the pithier definition: “philosophy is class struggle
in theory.”
In the interview with Navarro, Althusser insisted that the
characterization of philosophy as “class struggle in theory” was definitive.15
However, this neat periodization and the claim that this definition of

14
15

Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 240, 249fn27.
Ibid., 240.
8
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philosophy was final is complicated by the fact that Althusser introduced at
least five other definitions of Marxist philosophy during the course of his
career, three of which were coined between 1976 and 1986. These include
the definition of Marx’s philosophy as “void,” as “non-philosophy,16” as the
“Marxist position in philosophy” 17 as “hyper-materialism,” as a “materialism
of the encounter” and as “aleatory materialism.” Given these shifts, we
might wonder whether the successive changes or variations to his definition
of philosophy also meant changes to his understanding of science. If they
did, then there is perhaps an argument to be made for the evolution of
Althusser’s scientism. If not, then we can argue that Althusser’s view of
science, of science’s relation to philosophy, and the role of scientific
knowledge in politics remains more or less consistent after 1965.
2.1 Althusser’s scientism 1960-1965
The most well-known of Althusser’s positions on Marx’s
development, on Marxian philosophy, and on Marxist science were
promulgated between 1960 and 1965, first in a series of articles and then in
the books For Marx and Reading Capital. In addition to being original and
heterodox, these positions had the virtues of being clean, simple, and
formal. In these works, Althusser maintained that, sometime between 1845
and 1847, Marx broke with the idealist notions that characterized his early
work and that he then inaugurated a philosophy (dialectical materialism) that
allowed for the advancement of a critical materialist science of history
(historical materialism).18 Though Althusser also tried to show that Marx
could not and did not always render explicit concepts such as mode of
production, productive forces, relations of production, superstructure,
16

Althusser, “La transformation de la philosophie – Conférence de Grenade (1976),”
177.
17 Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 375.
18 Althusser, “On the Young Marx: Theoretical Quetions (1961)”; Resch, Althusser
and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, 169–170.
9
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contradiction, overdetermination, ideology, etc., that allowed this science to
proceed, he argued that these and other concepts could be made so by a
symptomatic reading of Marx’s mature writings.19
Along with this revisionist reading of Marx and the analytic work on
Marxist concepts, Althusser also undertook the complementary
epistemological task of explaining how Marxist science went about
producing true knowledge of the socioeconomic world and of how this
knowledge differs from the ideological understanding we have of it
spontaneously. According to Althusser, Marxist Science or “historical
materialism” differs from other social sciences. It does so both in terms of
its object, the history of class struggle, and in terms of its method, which is
synthetic and critical. Historical materialism is synthetic insofar as it employs
the results of the social and natural sciences in its own demonstrations. It is
critical insofar as it also sees fit to direct scientific research and to evaluate
any specific science’s results or methodology. However, historical
materialism does not differ in terms of being a science. As a science, it
makes use of a body of concepts and abstractive practices including
experimentation, observation, and quantification to develop new knowledge
about the real. This knowledge is verified by the criteria it has established in
the formation of its proper concepts. 20 Historical materialism also
recognizes the knowledge that it produces as provisional, that is, as
amenable or as able to be overturned through further scientific practice. 21
The knowledge that scientific practice produces is seen in its
openness and novelty to differ fundamentally from that other theoretical
practice which Althusser habitually contrasts it with and from which it
emerges: namely, ideological practice. Defined as that set of beliefs

19

Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy”; Solomon, “L’espacement de La
Lecture.”
20 Elliott, Althusser, 82.
21 Ibid., 84.
10
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necessarily held by groups of individuals whose effect is to guarantee the
reproduction of certain socioeconomic relations,22 ideology always relates
directly to the political and economic exigencies of the events that give birth
to it and to which it is subjected. As Althusser notes, ideology is “content to
reflect the historical changes which it is its mission to assimilate and
master.”23 Therefore, unlike science, which is potentially productive of new
knowledge and remains open to revision, ideology “is theoretically closed.” 24
But how does one tell the difference between scientific knowledge
and ideological knowledge? During this period, Althusser solved the
problem of demarcation by bringing in Marxist philosophy as arbiter.
Marxist philosophy, he maintained, is itself a science, but one that has as its
object the rational critique of the scientific ideas established in the course of
historical materialist research. Philosophy, he maintained, is the “Theory of
theoretical practices” and its job is to rationally differentiate between
ideological notions and scientific concepts. By seeing if a theory accords
with Marxist philosophical concepts, philosophy can rule on what
constitutes a genuine addition to knowledge.25 Without such an analysis,
Althusser argued, it is impossible to differentiate between scientific and
ideological knowledge. Further, and because correct action follows from

22

Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, 132–33.,
Althusser and Balibar, Reading “Capital,” 141–42.
24 Ibid.
25 To rehearse a simple example employed by Althusser, if some set of thinkers was
to claim that the historical essence of human beings is to be engaged in creative acts
that tend toward the overcoming of our own alienation, then a philosopher could use
her stock of Marxist concepts to analyze and critique this claim. Is it scientifically
warranted, this philosopher might ask, to believe that humans are fated to achieve the
self-overcoming of their own alienation through creative acts? Which of Marx’s
scientific concepts are used in order to make such a claim? What historical materialist
research supports such a claim? If no concepts are used and no support is given and
yet such a belief persists and is promulgated, then the historical materialist has reason
to suspect that the idea may be ideological and that it somehow reinforces existing
socioeconomic relations. Althusser, “Letter to the Central Committee of the PCF, 18
March 1966.”
23

11
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correct knowledge, without historical materialist research, it is impossible to
ensure correct political action. 26
Clearly, Althusser’s thinking about the relationship between scientific
knowledge and successful political action between 1960 and 1966 was
scientistic according to the definition of the term given above: historical
materialism is said to be the only human theoretical practice which allow us
to reliably understand existing socio-economic structures in their history,
their existence, and in their possible transformation. However, it is also true
that Althusser maintained during this period that Marxist science (historical
materialism) had need of Marxist Philosophy (dialectical materialism) in
order to certify its research and to monitor its progress. 27 Science, though
crucial for political progress, was not represented as an autonomous practice
that independently produces reliable results. Marxist philosophy was needed
to modify its body of knowledge and its methods by separating out from the
science any ideological contents. In this respect, philosophical practice
guaranteed historical materialism’s own scientificity.28
2.2 Althusser’s scientism 1966-1972
Despite fighting strongly for this position and for the political
recommendation which followed from it that the direction of the
Communist Party be given over to philosophers or at least that
philosophers’ voices be given more weight in party decision making, in 1966
Althusser began modifying his ideas about the definition of Marxist
philosophy and about its relation to Marxist Science. He also weakened his
claim about a clear break in Marx’s work.29 From this time on, he referred to
26

Ibid.
Althusser, “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and
Ideological Struggle.,” 5–13, 34–42.
28 Ibid., 38–40.
29 Lewis, “‘Editorial Introduction to Louis Althusser’s “Letter to the Central
Committee of the PCF, 18 March, 1966”.’”
27

12
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this epistemological stance as “theoreticist” and admitted his mistake in
thinking that philosophical practice allowed one to clearly differentiate
scientific from ideological knowledge. 30 While he did not give up on finding
a method to differentiate between the two types of knowledges, he also no
longer maintained that this could be done using solely rationalist criteria.
Though the transition was by no means sudden or entirely clean, by
1967 and certainly by the time he was preparing his lecture notes for the
seminars that would eventually be published as Philosophy and the Spontaneous
Philosophy of the Scientists, Althusser had revised his definition of philosophy.31
Philosophy was no longer understood as the “the theory of theoretical
practices.” Instead, he now ventured the thesis that “philosophy represents
politics in the domain of theory, or to be more precise: with the sciences – and,
vice versa, philosophy represents scientificity in politics.”32
In the early 1960s, philosophy was understood by Althusser to exist
outside of both ideology and science; it was an independent theoretical
practice that had its own rules and its own object. Now though, it was
thought to exist only as a void, as a partisan and critical moment within the
existing theoretical practices of ideology and science. 33 Within a specific
science’s body of theory, Althusser explained, philosophy acts in a partisan
manner when it works against that science’s tendency to embrace idealistic
explanations of its object.34 It also acts critically when it calls a specific
science’s attention to its own ideological contents. The contents that it
critiques may be ideological prejudices from the wider society that constitute
part of the conceptual assumptions of the science or they may be biases that
color its results and their reception. Alternately, these ideological contents
may consist in the importation of concepts proper to other sciences within a
30

Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 182–186.
Goshgarian, “Introduction,” xiii–xvi.
32 Macherey, “Althusser et Le Concept de Philosophie Spontanée Des Savants.”
33 Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 65.
34 Matheron, “The Recurrence of the Void in Louis Althusser,” 28.
31

13
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particular science’s explanatory schema.35 Within politics, Althusser
maintains, philosophy acts by demanding that our accepted ideas about the
world, about how it works, and about who inhabits it be subjected to
scientific scrutiny or that they be informed by scientific results. Because
scientific practice always and in the long run tends to the side of
materialism, this act is also a partisan intervention against ideal explanation
(and therefore against ideological support) of the socio-economic world and
its contents.36
As the last paragraph suggests, Althusser did not argue after 1966 that
the knowledge science produced was free from ideology or that philosophy
could emancipate it and us from all ideological thinking. In fact, one of the
main and lasting changes Althusser’s epistemology underwent between mid1966 and 1968 was his embrace of Foucault’s insight that thought always
functions in relation to politics or, better put, that all theory is political. 37 A
correlate to this insight was Althusser’s claim that science and ideology are
always admixed, that there is no definitive method for their separation, and
that ideological concepts always frame the production and reception of
scientific results.38 Despite this correlation, Althusser remained consistent in
his belief that scientific practice tends to produce a more reliable
understanding of the world (at least if we wish to change it) than does the
preexisting conception of our world that we find ready-to-hand (and mind)
in ideology. More specifically, Althusser persisted in his argument that all
societies are class societies riven by class conflict, and that, on the basis of
this discovery, Marx founded a science called historical materialism.39

35

Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 64.
Althusser, Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants, 1967, 96–98.
37 Garo, “The Impossible Break,” 282.
38 Althusser, Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants, 1967, 132–134.
39 Ibid., 256.
36

14
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Further, he argued that it was only by the adoption of this science that the
worker’s movement could potentially find success.40
Not only was Althusser steady in this position, he developed it
further in works like Lenin and Philosophy (1968) and in the 1968 interview
“Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon.” In texts from this phase in his
career, Althusser argued that historical materialism produces a reliable form
of socio-economic knowledge, one that can be used in the intentional
transformation of human social and economic relationships. As a critical
and overarching social scientific discipline, it makes use of the results from
specific sciences while also engaging in their critique and in their synthesis.41
Historical materialism’s critical powers are derived from its understanding of
historical necessities, of why we must think and act the way we do, and of
the ways we might potentially think and act. They are not derived from any
extra-scientific critical method, morality, or philosophical anthropology,
although this is always a danger that must be guarded against.42 Historical
materialism allows us to understand our history, our present, and our future
possibilities scientifically (that is, by way of abstractions from experience
and then by demonstrations).43 With this knowledge, philosophy can then
argue in politics. It can demonstrate what ideas about the social world are

40

Ibid., 130.
Althusser, “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy (1967),” 161.
42 As Althusser writes in the draft of a Communist Party manual in 1966 or early
1967 :
La critique de la société existante passe donc, dans le marxisme, par la critique
de ses principes idéologiques. Mais alors la critique prend un nouveau sens : il
ne s’agit plus de juger de la bonté ou de la malfaisance de telle société, au
nom de “valeurs” (morales ou juridiques) donc d’approuver et de condamner,il s’agit d’abord de connaître, donc de comprendre la nécessité à la fois de la
société existante et de ses principes idéologiques et de leur disparition. La
critique n’est pas première, elle est seconde à la connaissance de la nécessité
historique, elle ne lui est pas antérieure mais intérieure.
Althusser, “ALT2. A7-01.09 <<Théorie Marxiste et Parti Communiste>>
(<<Union théorie/pratique>>). (1966-1967).”
43 Ibid.; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the Object, the Soul of Marxism and
Other Singular Things,” 105.
41
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ideological (including philosophical ones), explain why they exist, and it can
suggest the correct actions to be taken if we want to change not only these
ideas but also the social forces that produce and sustain them. The result of
this intervention of philosophy into politics is better political practice; that
is, a political practice more likely to generate the results desired. 44
2.3 Althusser’s scientism 1972-1980
While most associate the definition of philosophy as “class struggle in
the field of theory” with Althusser’s short work from 1972 titled “A Reply
to John Lewis,” the approximate phrase appears already in the 1968
interview cited above. It is also strongly implied in the 1967 work Philosophy
and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists.45 However, it is in the polemic
against John Lewis that Althusser introduces its definitive formulation:
“philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in the field of theory.” 46
This new formulation marks more a simplification of the phrase
“philosophy represents politics in the domain of theory, or to be more
precise: with the sciences – and, vice versa, philosophy represents scientificity in
politics” than it does any significant change to its meaning. This is the case
because, as Althusser explains in the “Reply,” philosophy is only able to
affect these practices within theory itself. Philosophy does not march in the
streets, call for a general strike, or bribe an official. However, it can be
employed within politics to suggest that, based on a historical materialist
analysis of the historical conjuncture, it may be a propitious time to do any
one of the above.47 Philosophy also does not experiment, observe
phenomena, or reason deductively about natural or social processes.
44

Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 7; Althusser, Philosophy and the
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, 103.
45 Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other
Essays, 116–17; Baltas, “Critical Notice,” 655.
46 Althusser, “Reply to John Lewis,” 37.
47 Ibid., 58; Althusser, “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy (1967),” 166.
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However, within science and from the point of view of class politics, it can
move around in existing theory. Once there, it can critique the results of a
science or suggest that there are problems with a science’s presuppositions
or with its reasoning. These criticisms may change the way a science is
practiced and how it understands its object or it might even inaugurate a
new way of thinking about social processes and structures.48
Althusser’s streamlining of his definition of philosophy in 1972 did
little to change his understanding of the role of science in effective political
decision making. In fact, the first half of the 1970s saw Althusser refining
this position as part and parcel of his enduring war on two fronts against
Stalinism and Humanism within the communist party. The second half of
the decade though saw him developing his theory of how science
contributes to political change and how it influences philosophy in some
detail. This development was occasioned by discussion within the PCF of
whether or not it should drop from its platform the position that a
dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary to effect a transition from
capitalism to communism. Spurred on by these discussions and indignant
that a sound historical materialist concept developed over the course of the
worker’s movement might be dropped, Althusser elaborated his points
about how scientific knowledge must be harnessed so as to optimally inform
communist political action.
The specifics of Althusser’s plan to direct social scientific research
and to employ it in party political decision making are covered in myessay
“Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Social Theory (Notes Towards an
Althusserian Critical Theory)” and the political context is made clear in
Goshgarian’s 2006 introduction to Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings

48

Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, 117–118; Althusser, “Projet de livre sur
l’impérialisme. 1973,” 5–6, 9.
17
Published by OxyScholar, 2016

17

Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22

1978-87. 49 Rather than rehearse these details, it may be more useful in this
section to look at some texts from this period that evidence these
elaborations but that also show Althusser’s developing thoughts on the
relationship between philosophy and science.
A few writings from this period that show the development in
Althusser’s ideas about how Marxist science can aid the worker’s movement
and which also show the relationship between philosophy, politics, and
science are grouped together in Althusser’s archives under the rubric
“Textes divers sur la philosophie.” Their argument is difficult to follow if
one does not keep in mind that–by this point in his career–Althusser had
largely stopped repeating the communist dogma that Marxist philosophy is
identical with dialectical materialism. After trying for years to reconstruct
dialectical materialism as a “non-speculative, non-positivist” position in the
public (and communist party) mind and failing, Althusser had by this point
almost given up.50 Instead, he began to label the philosophy inaugurated by
Marx as, alternately: “the philosophy of Marx,” “a Marxist position in
philosophy” or, to better contrast it with the idealist philosophy of which
dogmatic dialectical materialism had for him become a representative, “antiphilosophy” or “non-philosophy.”51
If we register this change in nomenclature, we can better follow
Althusser’s critique of the position that “a science [and in particular the
science of historical materialism] is an integral part of a philosophy

49

Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction”; Lewis, “Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic
Social Theory (Notes Towards an Althusserian Critical Theory)”; Sotiris, “Philosophy
of the Encounter,” 148–49.
50 Althusser, “Elements of Self-Criticism,” 115.
51 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 32–33. By the end of 1978, Althusser had given
up trying to identify Marx’s philosophy with dialectical materialism and crossed the
term out from texts he was in the process of writing. He replaced it with the other
terms mentioned above; see Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les nonphilosophes, 375.
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[dialectical materialism.]”52 This Stalinist formula, he notes, has historically
deformed historical materialism; it has subordinated Marxist science to the
“philosophy” of dialectical materialism and to its laws. Why has this
subordination occurred? Althusser suggests that one reason may be the
influence of bourgeois ideology (in the form of bourgeois philosophy) on
the communist movement. However, he does not believe it is simply this.
The complementary reason he cites for historical materialism’s
subordination is the perennial need for philosophy and especially for idealist
philosophy to totalize, unify, and control all. 53 Against this tendency,
Althusser continues, “the sciences always present a certain danger to the
established order…they always have the smell of materialism and of liberty
about them…”54
Because they present this danger, Althusser explains, idealist
philosophy working on behalf of the established order tries to control the
sciences and, simultaneously, to provide them with their epistemological
guarantee. In providing this guarantee and by placing dialectical materialism
over and above historical materialism an existing political situation can be
justified or one can end up responding incorrectly to the actual political
demands of a situation. When philosophy is placed in this dominant
52

Althusser, “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie
marxiste.”
…il est surprenant, du point du vue marxiste d'entendre affirmer qu'une
science (le Matérialisme historique) est partie intégrante d'une philosophie (le
Matérialisme dialectique).
53 Ibid.
C'est clair pour la fonction apologétique de la philosophie : si la philosophie se
met au pouvoir sur les sciences, c'est pour leur extorquer l'aveu philosophique
d'un sens dont elle a besoin pour boucler son système au service de l'idéologie
dominante, contre le matérialisme. C'est clair aussi pour les fonctions de
contrôle et de garantie, puisque dans les deux cas il s'agit d'orienter les
sciences ou de les confiner dans un domine limité, pour bien s'assurer qu'elles
se tiendront tranquille à la place que leur assigne l'idéologie dominante.
54 Ibid.
…les sciences présentent toujours un certain danger pour l'ordre établi, ne
serait-ce que parce qu'elles ont toujours une certaine odeur de matérialisme et
de liberté?
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position it is charged with a huge number of strategic tasks, which it works
on without the benefit of the sciences. Althusser’s chief examples of these
tasks are that of defining what is human or what is good for humanity and
of deciding based on these understandings what are to be socialism’s and
communism’s main goals. However, by appealing only to philosophy to
make such definitions and to decide on its objectives, it sets up the
Communist Party’s direction (which has the power to dogmatically dictate
Marxist philosophy) as the communist movement’s sole authority.55
Althusser concludes these texts with a warning, a wager, and a promise. The
warning is that “when scientific analyses are lacking, it is necessary that
something else take their place. It is taken by philosophy.” 56 The wager is
that “Marxist philosophy has everything to gain from the abandonment of
all [philosophical] formulas” and that “the Marxist movement has
everything to gain from the correction of the practices which follow from
adherence to these formulas.” The promise is that “the worker’s movement
today…has everything to gain by making use of scientific, theoretical,
historical, and concrete analyses.” 57
55

56

Ibid.
Et derrière cette justification, derrière cette mise au pouvoir de la philosophie
sur la science marxiste- léniniste, se profilait une autre justification, où il était
aussi question de pouvoir: la justification du dirigeant du Parti à dire le dernier
mot sur toutes les questions, y compris les questions scientifiques, ce qui
supposait non seulement une certaine conception du rapport entre la
philosophie et les sciences, mais aussi une certaine conception du rapport
entre le dirigeant et le Parti, le Parti et l'État, et le Parti et les masses, et aussi,
bien entendu, une certaine conception de la lutte des classes.

Ibid.
…lorsque les analyses scientifiques manquent, il faut bien que leur place soit
prise: elle est prise par la philosophie.
57 Ibid.
Pour tout dire, la philosophie marxiste n'a rien à perdre, mais tout à gagner, en
abandonnant les formules dont la fonction d'apologétique, de contrôle et de
garantie sont évidentes. Et si, comme c'est à parier, ces fonctions ont des effets
pratiques réels, les marxistes ont tout à gagner à la rectification de ces
pratiques. Oui, tout à gagner. Et pour me limiter à un seul point, je dirais que
le Mouvement ouvrier a tout à gagner aujourd'hui à disposer des analyses
scientifiques, théoriques, historiques et concrètes, qui lui manquent
20
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In this warning about the deformation of Marxist science and of
Marxist political practice by the rationalizing force of idealist philosophy,
one can see Althusser’s consistent idea that scientific knowledge is what the
Marxist movement needs in order to correctly direct its political practice. In
their condemnation of philosophy as being for the most part idealist and as
serving bourgeois interests, one can also see in the Textes divers sur la
philosophie the emergence of a position characteristic of Althusser’s aleatory
materialism. This is not surprising as more than one observer has noted that
many of the ideas that were to characterize the Materialism of the
Encounter are clearly present in documents from this period.58
The co-existence of recognizably Aleatory Materialist ideas with ideas
that we have already labeled as scientistic is also found in an unpublished
manuscript from 1976. Titled “Être marxiste en philosophie,” This text begins
with a critique of philosophies which try to totalize all entities and
occurrences and which posit an origin as well as an end to the world. Part of
this manuscript reads just like the criticism of idealist historiography that is
found in writings from the 1980s.59 In addition, it includes a discussion of
the “givenness” of the world (citing Heidegger positively) and lauds
Epicurus for his idea of contingency and of the encounter. Further, it
includes the idea of a Kulturkampf in philosophy between materialist and
idealist camps.60
However, notwithstanding all the thematic similarities to Althusser’s
Aleatory Materialist writings, at a certain point there is a clear shift to

cruellement: je ne parle pas d'analyses d'inspiration philosophique, mais des
analyses scientifiques…
58 Goshgarian, “Translator’s Introduction,” xvi–xvii, xlv–xlviii; Goshgarian, “The
Very Essence of the Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things,” 89–90;
Beaulieu, “La politique de Gilles Deleuze et le matérialisme aléatoire du dernier
Althusser˚,” 162–163.
59 Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.03, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 13-24
(1976),” 10–13.
60 Ibid., 72–73, 98–100, 110–112.
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science and a justification of Marxist scientific practice that the published
writings associated with the materialism of the encounter do not make as
clearly. In fact, there is a long and rather surprising section in Être marxiste en
philosophie,” where Althusser points out his agreement with Karl Popper on
the criterion for distinguishing a scientific theory from other types of ideas.
Though he does not agree with Popper that we can say in advance whether
a scientific theory is falsifiable, he does concur with Popper’s point that
hypotheses that cannot be invalidated by experience are not scientific.61
If historical materialism is a science, Althusser maintains, it must be
able to be validated. If this is so, then in what way is its results validated?
Historical materialism, Althusser explains, like mathematics and
psychoanalysis, presents a special case among the sciences because its results
are not experimentally reproducible. Mathematics is distinct because the
objects that it studies are not material; rather, it has for its object the results
of its prior practices. Its demonstrations therefore do not consist of
experimental proofs, but in a logical reordering or analysis of its objects.62
Psychoanalysis and historical materialism are unique as well, Althusser
maintains, because, in contrast to the natural sciences which study the
material real and whose findings (as theoretical representations of universal
elements) are or should be infinitely reproducible, they have for their object
complex historical singularities or “conjunctures.” Unlike the universal
elements that natural science studies, the moment of the class struggle
61

Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 1-12 (1976),”
19.
L’expérience historique (et les exemples foissonent) montre au contraire
qu’on ne peut jamais décider d’avance si telle théorie est scientifique ou non,
c-à-d sera ou non vérifiée ou infirmée (démentie) par l’expérimentation. On
peut même soutenir l’idée qu’il existe des théorie scientifique, comme le
marxisme et la psychanalyse, bêtes noires de Popper…qui échappent
apparemment aux “critères” de la vérification et du démenti expérimental, car
les expériences qui y sont pratiquées ne peuvent pas être reproduisent dans des
conditions absolument identiques.
62 Ibid., 20–21.
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studied by historical materialism or the moment in a subject’s psyche
analyzed by depth psychology “is singular and only defines and describes
itself progressively in the course of the analysis or of the struggle itself.63 This
does not mean that these science’s findings cannot be confirmed, only that
they are confirmed by experience but not by ‘experiment.’”64 In this sense,
the proof of historical materialism’s and psychoanalysis’ truth is “inseparable
from the direct transformation of their object[s].”65
The rudiments of such a practical transformation and therefore of
such a validation are spelled out in more detail in a book written by
Althusser between 1976 and 1978 (but only recently edited and published)
titled Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes. In a chapter devoted to
“Philosophy and the Science of Class Struggle,” Althusser imagines how and
under what conditions such a transformation (and thereby confirmation) is
possible. He supposes that the conditions for such a transformation are the
following. First, that the members of a non-exploitative class become
unified in their understanding of themselves as exploited subjects and that
they do so by subscribing to a philosophy that facilitates this unification.
Then, if that class “arms itself with a scientific theory of class struggle, the
conditions of that philosophy’s elaboration will change completely.” This
philosophy will change from a “blind” and subjective class ideology
expressing and ensuring that class’s relation to the dominant mode of

63

Ibid., 21bis.
Ce qui distingue le dispositif expérimental des sciences de la nature du
dispositif du marxisme et de la PA [psychanalyse], c’est que le premier est
monté de toutes pièces, en fonction d’éléments universels parfaitement définis
au départ, alors que dans la cure analytique et dans la lutte des classes, ils sont
singuliers et ne se décrivent et définissent que progressivement au cours de la
cure et de la lutte.
64 Ibid., 20, 21bis.
65 Ibid., 21bis.
… chacun voit bien que la théorie [psycho]analytique et la théorie marxiste à
la différence des autres pratiques scientifiques, sont inséparables de la
transformation directe de leur objet.
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production to an objective and “conscious determination, assured by
scientific knowledge of [that relation’s] conditions, of its forms, of its
laws.”66
This philosophy (just like all philosophies) will then be deployed
politically. It will suggest to politicians, or at least to those who can direct
the expression of political power, the reasons and objective means for the
transformation of these relations. From this will follow a political line.67 As
Althusser maintains in another document from the same period, if this
philosophy does not include objective, social scientific knowledge of
existing relations–of that which produces and sustains them and of what
tendencies in them might allow for their transformation–and if the
philosophy does not grow and change from lessons learned in the course of
its implementation, then there is no hope of choosing the correct line and
for the transformation of existing relations.68 Without this knowledge, the
philosophy expressed by the non-exploitative class and the political choices
that follow from it are easily influenced and countered not only by the
dominant ideology, but also by the repressive state apparatuses (army, state,
66

Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 364.
Mais supposez une classe qui n’exploite personne, lutte pour sa libération et
pour la suppression des classes ; supposez que, dans son combat, cette même
classe entreprenne de s’unifier elle-même en unifiant son idéologie de classe,
et unifie cette idéologie en forgeant une philosophie qui parvienne à cette
unification ; alors, si cette classe est armée d’une théorie scientifique de la
lutte des classes, les conditions de l’élaboration de sa philosophie changent du
tout au tout. Car la dépendance dans laquelle cette philosophie va
nécessairement se trouver à l’égard de l’idéologie politique du prolétariat ne
sera pas une servitude aveugle, mais, au contraire, une détermination
consciente, assurée par la connaissance scientifique de ses conditions, de ses
formes, et de ses lois.
67 Ibid., 364–65.
Nous pouvons maintenant avancer qu’elles peuvent être dites « justes », si cet
adjectif « juste » désigne l’effet d’un ajustement prenant en compte tous les
éléments d’une situation donnée dans laquelle une classe lutte pour atteindre
ses objectifs. « Juste » est alors l’adjectif non de la justice, catégorie morale,
mais de la justesse, catégorie pratique, qui indique l’adaptation des moyens
aux fins, en fonction de la nature de classe de celui qui les poursuit.
68 Althusser, “Que Faire? (1978),” 17–24.
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police, laws, courts, etc.),69 which guarantee the reproduction of the
conditions of the proletariat’s exploitation.70
In the spring of 1980, Althusser gave an interview to his friend,
Italian journalist Giorgio Fanti.71 In it, he answered wide-ranging queries
about present political issues, about the difference between Italian and
French communist parties, about the current crisis in the communist
movement, and about how to resolve it. He also reflected on his career as a
whole and offered up some reflections on the relations between philosophy,
science, and politics. Regarding Marxist philosophy, Althusser stated in no
uncertain terms his judgment that “dialectical materialism” as it had been
historically formulated through the course of the Marxist movement is
“absolutely indefensible” and that it has nothing to do with Marx’s
philosophy.72 Though less detailed than the balance sheet provided in the
1978 essay “Marx in his Limits,” Althusser supported this contention by
tallying up the idealistic philosophical mistakes committed not only by
Marx’s interpreters, but also by Marx himself.73
When asked by Fanti whether his rejection of dialectical materialism for a
version of Marx’s position in philosophy that Althusser now referred to as
“sur-matérialisme” or “hyper-matérialisme,” meant a change to his position
regarding the Marxist science of historical materialism, Althusser offered a
detailed and passionate reply. He began by saying that his core argument
had not changed and that “we must defend in the trenches the idea that
Marxism is a revolutionary science.”74 Further, though he continued to
disavow his earlier position that there is a definitive break in Marx’s
69

Althusser, Sur la reproduction, 95–95.
Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, 362.
71 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti.”
72 Ibid., 51–52.
73 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 26–61.
74 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti,” 52.
J’ai dit alors qu’il fallait défendre dans la tranchée l’idée que le marxisme est
une science révolutionnaire.
70
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philosophy when Marx rejects idealist philosophy and becomes scientific,
Althusser told his interviewer that that there remains a discernable
difference between Marx’s scientific ideas (which are sound and potentially
transformative) and his philosophical ideas (which were mostly bourgeois
and ideological).75 When Fanti asked a follow-up question about whether or
not Althusser had said in 1973 that dialectical materialism was the
undeniable core to Marx’s thought,76 Althusser replied:
“No, no. On the contrary, for me, [this core] is historical
materialism… If this word designated something, it was that
there was something scientific in Marx. It remains to be seen if
the extent of the scientific ground opened by Marx was
effectively as big as we had believed it to be, as Marx believed,
etc. What I have always defended is the idea that there is
something scientific in Marx, and I will defend that always.77

3. Althusser 1982-1987: Marxist philosophy without Marxist Science?
The 1980 interview with Giorgio Fanti contains Althusser’s last
recorded and edited thoughts on the relations between philosophy, science,
and politics prior to the two-year philosophical caesura occasioned by
Althusser’s murder of his wife, Hélène Rytmann on November 16, 1980.
Some readers have argued that Althusser’s thought underwent a change
during this interval or that a change begun in 1975 or 1976 was solidified.
These analysts maintain that when Althusser began writing again in the
75

Ibid., 50–51.
Fanti is probably misremembering the line from Althusser, “Elements of SelfCriticism,” 117. where Althusser states: “Yes, it is quite correct for us to speak of an
unimpeachable and undeniable scientific core in Marxism, that of historical
materialism.”
77 Althusser, “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti,” 51–52.
Non, non. Pour moi le matérialisme historique, contrairement ! Justement Si
ce mot désignait quelque chose, c’était ce qu’il pouvait y avoir de scientifique
dans Marx. Quitte à voir, si effectivement, l’extension du domaine scientifique
ouvert par Marx était aussi grande qu’on avait pu le croire, que Marx le
croyait, etc….Ce que j’ai toujours défendu c’est l’idée qu’il y avait quelque
chose de scientifique dans Marx, et ça je le défends toujours.
76

26
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

26

Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

summer of 1982 it was with a profoundly changed view of the relation
between Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist politics. In this
new assessment, Marxist science was dismissed while ontology and politics
were foregrounded. Exploring neither the plausibility of this claim nor its
possible external political and philosophical motivations, 78 this section of
the paper will briefly explore how some readers have argued that there was
such a modification in Althusser’s attitude towards science in his idea of
philosophy after 1980.
Within Althusser scholarship, there is a divide between those who
emphasize a continuist reading of his work and those who emphasizes its
breaks. The “breakist” understanding, which emphasizes the changes or
ruptures in his thought, was in the majority in the 1990s and remains a
popular interpretive rubric. Almost all who hold this position argue that
Althusser renounced his scientism in his last works.79 However, among
those scholars who have worked extensively with posthumously published
materials and who have tried to comprehend the arc of his career, a
continuist consensus has emerged over the last decade that focuses on the
permanence of certain themes in Althusser’s work. These themes include
the primacy of relations, the idea of the conjuncture, the claim that history is
a process without a subject, and the idea of philosophy as a void.80 Even
amongst the continuists, however, a significant majority explicitly holds the
78

Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> – Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le
dernier Althusser.” In this essay Garo offers a comprehensive assessment of the
political and philosophical climate that may have encouraged the foregrounding of
ontology and politics in Althusser’s work in the mid 1980s.
79 Bargu, “In the Theater of Politics”; Bensaïd, “Un univers de pensée aboli,” 253;
Diefenbach, “Althusser with Deleuze”; Elliott, “Postscript”; Garo, “<<Il Pleut>> –
Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique du vide chez le dernier Althusser”; Haider
and Mohandesi, “Underground Currents”; Navarro, “An Encounter with Althusser,”
96; Thomas, “Althusser’s Last Encounter”; Williams, “Althusser and Spinoza,” 73–
74.
80 Morfino, “An Althusserian Lexicon”; Goshgarian, “The Very Essence of the
Object, the Soul of Marxism and Other Singular Things”; Matheron, “The Recurrence
of the Void in Louis Althusser.”
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position that Althusser gave up his scientism in the 1980s or else supports
this position implicitly by emphasizing only the political and philosophical
aspects of Althusser’s thought from this period. 81 Despite a near consensus
among his readers that Althusser gave up his scientism in the 1980s, there is
a contingent of continuists who argue that Althusser’s scientism remains
consistent throughout his career.82 One purpose of the present paper is to
provide more and better evidence of this consistency.
The next few paragraphs will summarize the accounts of a few
representative readers who explicitly maintain that Althusser gave up his
scientism in the 1980s. This survey will begin with one interpreter who
accentuates the break from Althusser’s earlier philosophical positions with
the advent of aleatory materialism. It will then review the readings of two
representative continuists, both of whom maintain that–despite the deep
continuities discernible in Althusser's philosophy as a whole–his later
philosophy lacks the scientistic element that had previously marked his
thought. Following this review, the form, presentation, and content of
Althusser’s posthumously published work on the materialism of the
encounter will be examined in order to show why, based on these texts,
there are perhaps good reasons for thinking that Althusser altered his
position on the role of science in his political philosophy as a whole. In
addition to a close and comparative reading of Althusser’s published and
81
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unpublished texts from the late 1970s and 80s, the final section of this paper
will make use of one “continuist non-breakist” reading of aleatory
materialism to support its contention that Althusser’s writings include a
mostly consistent understanding of the relations between scientific
knowledge and political action.
3.1 Althusser’s Scientism abandoned?
The best-known identifier of a break in Althusser’s thought is
Antonio Negri. In a frequently cited essay that appeared only two years after
the collections that contained the bulk of Althusser’s reflections on aleatory
materialsim (Sur la philosophie and Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 1) were
published, Negri argues that Althusser’s last writings evidence a profound
kehre or turn in his thought. Negri pegs the beginning of this turn to
Althusser’s rereading of Machiavelli in 1978. At this time, Negri maintains,
“the structural framework of Althusser’s previous theoretical analysis is
completely reversed: theory does not show the convergences and
consequences, in a structural and systemic manner; on the contrary, it shows
ruptures, paradoxes, voids and points of crisis.” 83 This structural change,
Negri argues, firmly took hold by the early 1980s. At this time and in the
works comprising the corpus of aleatory materialism, Althusser developed
“an ontological conception of crisis as key to an understanding of the
historical process and as motor of the transformation of the real.” 84 In this
ateleological universe constituted solely of discrete materials bound and
sundered only by “chance and event,” a revolutionary struggle can happen
anywhere and at any time. No longer burdened by a “distinction between
ideological and non-ideological thinking”85 or by the need to scientifically
analyze the conditions of a revolution, any subject “in the open freedom of
83
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the surface” can assert an aleatory revolutionary thesis, (“a revolutionary
truth unacceptable to the given conditions”86), which may have the
possibility of overturning current theoretical practices. At least as Negri
interprets Althusser, aleatory materialism includes a denial of the difference
between ideological and scientific knowledge and, therefore, of the practical
efficacy of scientific knowledge in politics. Because, according to Negri, any
given condition is subject to change by an unexpected event, it is
simultaneously an affirmation of the supremacy of philosophy (which may
operate in the void beyond current theoretical practices) in politics.87
Negri’s position on aleatory materialism is extremely loose and
schematic and it takes many liberties in its citations, interpretations, and
overall argumentation. Probably not coincidentally, the aleatory materialism
described by Negri anticipates and prophetically justifies many of the
positions that Negri was simultaneously asserting in his own work.88
However, even among those readers who are not so obviously involved in
acts of creative appropriation, who read Althusser carefully, and who take
an overall continuist view of his work, the thesis that aleatory materialism
includes a renunciation of Althusser’s philosophy’s scientistic elements
remains an influential interpretation.
Among the proponents of the view that aleatory materialism–despite
its fundamental continuity with the rest of his oeuvre–includes a
renunciation of his political philosophy’s scientistic element is Althusser’s
biographer, Yann Moulier-Boutang. In a 1997 article that is mostly
concerned with the relation between Althusser’s biography and his
contradictory philosophical claims, Moulier-Boutang states that the
theoretical crisis brought on by Althusser’s relinquishment of dialectical
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materialism led around 1975 or 1976 to the “abandonment of historical
materialism” and its “apparatus of scientific laws of history…in favor of a
logic of the singular situation, of the pure political practice of the aleatory
encounter.” 89 The details of this abandonment are provided by MoulierBoutang in a 2005 essay titled “Le matérialisme comme politique aléatoire.”
In this paper, Moulier-Boutang connects aleatory materialism with the logic
of overdetermination developed by Althusser in the early 1960s. 90 In
addition to persuasively forging this connection, Moulier-Boutang argues
that, with the materialism of the encounter, Althusser gave up on the idea of
using Marx’s historical materialist scientific tools to engage in “the concrete
analysis of the concrete situation.” 91 As he sees it, Althusser abandoned this
idea in his later works because he grasped that “revolution is an irreducible,
unpredictable, ‘overdetermined’ event” and because the idea of univocal
causality and the assumption of continuity in nature cannot explain such
revolutionary occurrences.92 With this realization, Moulier-Boutang
maintains, Althusser put to one side his older supposition that historical
change happens in an orderly and predictable way as well as the
corresponding idea that, because of this orderliness, scientific analysis of the
present conjuncture will allow one to understand how to occasion
revolutionary change. The prior ontological assumption of orderliness was
replaced with the supposition of “the absolutely arbitrary character of
89
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existence.” 93 Further, the idea of the usefulness of concrete analysis for first
understanding and then precipitating revolutionary change gave way in
Althusser’s late thought to the idea that an aleatory materialist ontology
demands that we think of revolutionary politics as an art rather than as a
science.94 As a practitioner of this art of revolution, Moulier-Boutang
explains, the aleatory materialist philosopher stops looking at what was and
what is in order to see what can be changed in the future; he does so
because he recognizes that the relation between present patterns and future
possibilities is always uncertain.95 Akin to and inspired by Machiavelli, such a
philosopher instead steps into an existing situation and attempts to found an
absolutely new political regime where one has not before existed. To do so,
he or she must “think of politics as the meeting of the conditions of
becoming, of that which is not still, of that which is otherwise missed.” 96
Like Moulier-Boutang in 2005 but in much more detail, Mikko
Lahtinen in his 2008 book Politics and Philosophy: Niccolo Machiavelli and Louis
Althusser's Aleatory Materialism attempts to show what Althusser’s late
thinking on the materialism of the encounter owes to his reading(s) of
Machiavelli. As with Moulier-Boutang, this account includes the thesis that
aleatory materialism includes a renunciation of the scientistic elements of
Althusser’s political philosophy. Along with many others, Lahtinen is critical
of the scientism in Althusser’s work prior to 1980. He correctly recognizes
that between 1960 and 1965 Althusser sought to position Marxism “as a
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high-standard science able to withstand critique.”97 He also rightly notices
that later, during the period of his self-criticism, Althusser became less
optimistic about the possibility of separating science from ideology (even as
Althusser still insisted that critical science was essential to the revolutionary
movement).98 When the book comes to its interpretation of Althusser’s
aleatory materialism, however, Lahtinen contends that the idea of science
did not play an important role in Althusser’s late political philosophy. With
aleatory materialism, Lahtinen maintains, Althusser renounced even the
epistemologically modest idea, which dated from the period of his selfcriticism that Marxism should be thought of as a critical science perpetually
on guard against its idealist contents and suppositions. He replaced it,
Lahtinen argues, with a “philosophy for Marxism,” which understands itself
as a non-scientific critical political practice. Lahtinen traces the reason for
this change to Althusser’s reflections on Machiavelli. Through these
sustained (if intermittent) readings, Lahtinen argues, Althusser developed an
increasingly subjectivist epistemological position, one of whose
consequences was a changed understanding of the relationship between
politics and philosophy.
The basic argument of Lahtinen runs like this. From his sustained
reading of Machiavelli, Althusser learned that an objective standpoint on
politics is impossible and that “the effects of coincidences and exceptions
on human life” as well as the perspectival nature of all political knowledge
made a “general theory about human life or praxis in general” likewise
unrealizable.99 This new awareness excluded the possibility of an objective,
universal, “modern” political science upon which a revolutionary science of
politics might be based.100 However, according to Lahtinen, Althusser also
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absorbed from Machiavelli the lesson that the subjective knowledge of a
particular political situation from a particular perspective is not the sole type
of knowledge available to the aleatory materialist philosopher but that this
practical knowledge is desirable for the philosopher who wishes to
encourage revolutionary change. Because politics is not predictable in the
same way as physics, knowledge of a conjuncture (of a particular socioeconomic-historical arrangement) cannot come from an understanding of
the general laws of social organization or from laboratory-like experiments
on persons or on social groupings.101 Rather, in order to be effective, the
aleatory materialist philosopher or political actor must study “the constants
repeated from one case to another, knowledge of which may be useful for
the political actor planning a strategy of action.” This actor must also be
sensitive to the workings of chance and to the specifics of his or her
situation102 Unlike Moulier-Boutang, who goes from the identification of an
aleatory materialist ontology to the requirement that we think of
revolutionary politics as an art rather than as a science and also unlike Negri,
who goes from ontology to rhetoric, for Lahtinen, the ontological portion
of Althusser’s aleatory materialism appears as secondary or instrumental.
According to this reading, the primary reason for Althusser abandoning any
claim to the scientificity in Marxism in his later works is the realization,
taken from Machiavelli, that as participants we can have no objective
knowledge of laws animating our social life and that radical changes to our
social life always appear as a surprise, without knowable antecedent cause or
causes.
3.2 Internalist explanation of the abandonment thesis
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In contrast to Negri’s reading, the accounts of Moulier-Boutang and
Lahtinen are well sourced and take few liberties with the posthumously
published texts on aleatory materialism. However, irrespective of the quality
of the analysis or whether or not their author is a continuist or a breakist,
the majority of scholars who have engaged with Althusser’s late works have
come to the conclusion that, in them, Althusser abandons the scientism that
was hitherto a constant in his political philosophy. As this paper will argue
in its final section that this is not the case and that aleatory materialism
represents a prolongation and elaboration of positions and ideas already
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, we should perhaps seek an explanation
for why so many readers believe that aleatory materialism represents a
change from Althusser’s previous endorsement of scientism.
Even if we avoid referencing the personal, political and philosophical
circumstances of their writing, by looking at the selection and editorial
presentation of the works constituting the aleatory materialism corpus we
can find sufficient internal explanation for the preponderance of the
interpretation that Althusser abandons scientism in his work from the
1980s. Indeed, given the content of the available texts, their presentation,
and their immediate reception, the conclusion that Althusser dropped his
scientism appears somewhat warranted. The next two paragraphs will
examine explicit statements from these texts that tend to support such a
conclusion. The paragraph that follows them will look at a few relatively
clear editorial inclusions as a factor in this work’s reception as anti- or nonscientistic.
In both their French and English editions, the philosophical essays
on aleatory materialism are accompanied by letters which Althusser wrote to
friends and collaborators and with an interview whose status is somewhere
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between that of original work and collaboration.103 The letters in particular
provide an account of Althusser’s mental state at the time of the project.
They also set out its philosophical and political intent as well its historical
and biographical context. Clearly present in many of these epistles is
Althusser’s desire to synthesize and present ideas that had been percolating
for years in an accessible form and to construct a “philosophy for
Marxism.” 104 As this philosophy was presented as “new” or as a break from
Althusser’s previous work it is little wonder that people have looked to see
how this work differs from the previous philosophy.105 One can add to this
the fact that a few of the letters and interviews included passages where
Althusser seems to denigrate or question his prior work and to problematize
its account of the sciences.
Two letters and two interview responses stand out in particular for
the way in which they seem to show Althusser in the process of rejecting his
earlier scientism. In the first, a 1978 letter addressed to the Georgian
philosopher Merab Mardashvili, Althusser announces himself as being in a
period of transition and hints at the gestation of the materialism of the
encounter (no doubt the reason this letter is included).106 He also reflects on
his previous work and its relation to the sciences, writing: “I see clear as day
that what I did fifteen years ago was to fabricate a little, typically French
justification, in a neat little rationalism bolstered with a few references
(Cavaillès, Bachelard, Canguilhem, and, behind them, a bit of the SpinozaHegel tradition), for Marxism's (historical materialism's) pretension to being
a science.” 107 In another letter, this one from April of 1986 and addressed to
Fernanda Navarro, Althusser instructs his collaborator on how to edit and
103
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improve the text of the interview she was conducting with him, writing: “I'd
like you to drop the passage about 'lines of demarcation' in the sciences,
particularly the demarcation between the scientific and the ideological, as
well as everything pertaining to the difference between ideology and the
ideological.” 108
In the published interviews, we see two more responses that seem to
show Althusser in the process of rejecting his earlier scientism. In the first,
Althusser responds to a question posed by Navarro about the distinctive
features a materialist philosophy might be said to display with the reply,
“…it does not claim to be autonomous or to ground its own origin and its
own power. Nor does it consider itself to be a science, and still less the
Science of sciences.109 In the second, Althusser replies to a question about
the nature of history by stating that the objects of Marxism and
psychoanalysis “belong not to accomplished history but to Geschichte, to
living history, which is made of, and wells up out of, aleatory tendencies and
the unconscious. This is a history whose forms have nothing to do with the
determinism of physical laws.”110
In addition to statements and passages like these which seem to imply
that Althusser was in the process of rethinking the position that Marxism is
a science or even that he was engaged in this position’s active denigration
and renunciation, there are also the unfinished 1978 essay “Marx in his
limits” and the likewise fragmentary “Machiavelli and Us.” The former was
published with the aleatory materialist writings while the latter appeared in
French and English editions during the 1990s alongside prefaces that
suggested the connection between Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli and
the materialism of the encounter.111 As has been noted above, one source of
108
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the claim that Althusser renounces his scientism are the passages in his
writing on Machiavelli where Althusser says that he is not interested in
Machiavelli as a founder of political science but only as a philosopher of the
contingent event.112 That this may have been a conscious choice of
Althusser’s to concentrate on the relation between philosophy and politics
rather than a dismissal of political science tout court, however, seems to have
been missed.113
A similar interpretation appears to have been made in the case of
“Marx in his Limits” as well as the other “texts of the crisis”: “Marxism
Today (1978)” and “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976).” Each
speaks extensively of science and of Marxist science. 114 However, each does
so almost exclusively in pejorative terms, enumerating the problems that
have resulted in the worker’s movement due to its adoptions of certain
“Marxist scientific” concepts about the material nature of the world,
concepts that are, in reality, merely idealist philosophical notions.115 The lack
of any mention of Marxist theory of science in positive terms, as well as the
diagnosis of a “crisis in Marxism” caused in part by Marxism’s erroneous
scientific claims might lead one to conclude that, during the late 1970s’
“crisis of Marxism,” Althusser abandoned his longstanding claim that
Marxism is a science, that this science is historical materialism, and that its
object is the history of class struggle. Indeed, some read these texts as
announcing this repudiation. For example, one of Althusser’s best readers,
Gregory Elliott, was moved to interpret these texts in this way. In a postscript and intellectual balance sheet included with the second edition of The
Detour of Theory (2006) he wrote:
112
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Around 1976, a new period [of Althusser’s work] begins,
which is one not of the auto-critique, but of the autodeconstruction – even self-destruction – of Althusserianism
and the radical problematisation of the scientificity of Marxism
itself. It is most dramatically attested to in the 1977 talk ‘The
Crisis of Marxism’ and the 1978 encyclopaedia article
‘Marxism Today’ – texts whose content overlaps with that of
the abandoned manuscript on ‘Marx in His Limits’. Writings
of a break, they can also be regarded as in some sense
transitional works, paving the way for a final period of
Althusserian production.116

4. An aleatory materialism consistent with Marxist Science?
In the preceding section we have suggested why, given the form,
presentation, and content of the published texts, readers of Althusser might
come to hold the position that he gave up his scientism in the 1980s.
Nonetheless, given the manifest consistency of his scientism prior to 1980
(as detailed in section 2 of this paper and summarized again below), we have
reason to be suspicious of this inference. Another reason to mistrust this
conclusion is that the information that it is based upon is partial: the bulk
of Althusser’s writings having to do with the materialism of the encounter
and its gestation remain unpublished.117 In addition, the principal texts
which develop this philosophy have been subject to marked editorial
interventions. For instance, in order to compose the essay “The
Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” the
introductory chapters of the book provisionally entitled J'écris ce livre en octobre
1982 were cut. These chapters include an evaluation of the present
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conjuncture and specific recommendations for political action.118 Rather
than presenting J'écris ce livre en octobre 1982 as Althusser unambiguously
intended–as an attempt to think the (then) present conjuncture “otherwise,”
this omission gives the appearance that, in one of the two principal texts on
aleatory materialism, Althusser was exclusively involved in the development
(exhumation?) of a politico-ontological philosophical tradition.119 In
addition to debatable rearrangements, comparable omissions mark that
other principal aleatory materialism text, “Philosophy and Marxism:
Interviews with Fernanda Navarro.” Also missing from consideration or, in
the case of Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, only recently
published, are numerous texts from the 1970s (some of them book-length)
which clearly contain aleatory materialist arguments and concepts and that
may or may not corroborate the thesis that Althusser was in the process of
abandoning his scientism or that this abandonment went along with aleatory
materialism’s development.120
Except for in one instance where Althusser gave specific permission
that a text be edited and published posthumously (and that only in Latin
America), there is little reason to privilege the published texts over those still
held in the archive.121 Therefore, in trying to make the judgment of whether
118
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or not, in his later works, Althusser abandoned his scientism, it is both licit
and important to consider the unpublished writings. To the end of making
such a determination, the next section of the paper will examine relevant
passages from the posthumous collections of Althusser’s writings as well as
some texts from the period 1982-1987 that remain unpublished. In so
doing, it will provide a counter-reading to those accounts which argue that
Althusser gave up his scientism in the late 1970s as well as to those which
claim that Althusser’s thought emerged in 1982 cleansed of its previous
scientism. The primary goals of this counter-reading will be to demonstrate
that Althusser did not abandon his scientism and to show how it appears in
his later work as a continuous and important part of his Marxist theory. A
secondary objective will be to account for the seemingly anti-scientistic
statements detailed above.
4.1 An alternative to the abandonment thesis
If one wants to build the argument that Althusser rejected the
scientistic aspect of his thought in his later works, the claim that he emerged
in the summer of 1982 after two years marked by trauma, by severe mental
illness, by institutionalization, and by little access to philosophical materials
with a profoundly changed view of Marxist thought appears psychologically
implausible. As it explains the origin of such a change in the context of a
profound theoretical and political struggle in which Althusser rejected his
well-known claims about the scientificity of Marxism, the theory that marks
the origin of this rejection in the texts from “crisis of Marxism” period
appears the much more likely account. However, based on the sum of
available evidence is the best reading of what was happening in Althusser’s
philosophy during the late 1970s and is it the best explanation for the
genesis of his work from the 1980s?
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The examination of Althusser’s published and unpublished writings
from 1972-1980 in section 2.3 of this paper showed that he was neither in
the process of reconsidering the position that Marxism is a science nor that
he was modifying the corresponding assertion that there is a necessary
relationship between correct scientific knowledge and effective political
action. On the contrary, most of the texts from this period emphasize this
relation. They also show that Althusser attempted to work out the practical
details of how Marxist science should be pursued and then integrated into
political decision making. Though some of the published materials display
little of this effort, the recently published Initiation à la philosophie pour les nonphilosophes (1978) includes an extensive discussion of the relations between
Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist politics as well as a clear
endorsement of Marxist science.122 In short this book, as well as many other
lengthy and (as yet) unpublished pieces, show Althusser developing the
argument in philosophical, practical, and polemical terms that intentional
political change is best enabled by scientific analyses of the political
conjuncture.123
If it is the case that Althusser did not abandon his claims about the
scientificity of Marxism in the late 1970s, then what was he up to in works
like “Marx in his Limits” and “Marxism Today” that are singled out by some
critics as evidence of this undoing and which gave rise to this confusion? As
we have argued, the explanation that fits the available evidence is that
Althusser was in the process of doing with Marxist science something very
similar to that which he was simultaneously trying to do with Marxist
philosophy. Specifically, he was attempting to purge it of its ideological
components and, therefore, of its idealist content and inheritance.
122

Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes, chapters 4, 9,10,
17–19.
123 Althusser, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes; Althusser, “Que
Faire? (1978)”; Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire”; Althusser,
“ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie marxiste.”
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Rather than condemning Marxist science as a whole, the Marxist
science that Althusser ruthlessly critique between 1975 and 1980 is the
version of historical materialism historically paired with Marxist philosophy
and that is known as “dialectical materialism.” Understood as “an integral
part of dialectical materialism” or as a “result of the application of dialectical
materialism to history,” this version of Marxist science has historically been
dominated and defined by its dyadic relation with an idealist metaphysics of
history and of nature.124 That the historical pairing of historical materialism
and dialectical materialism has had deleterious consequences for the
worker’s movement, Althusser often marks as obvious between 1976 and
1980.125 Nevertheless, it does not follow from Althusser’s simultaneous
dismantling of historical materialism and of dialectical materialism that “the
core of Marxist thought” is not scientific. After all, simultaneous to these
critiques, Althusser was in the process of working out what a scientific
analysis of the present socioeconomic and political conjuncture should
include.126 He was also arguing that, in order for political action to be
successful, the communist party must engage in critical social scientific
analyses of the present conjuncture.127 Further, and as evidenced by the
Fanti interview and many other texts from this period, Althusser did not shy
away from calling this analysis “historical materialist.” Seen in this context,
Althusser’s criticism of historical materialism in the late 1970s appears as
deeply complementary to his simultaneous elaboration of a renewed
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Althusser, “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie
marxiste.”
On trouve en effet de nos jours constamment, sous la plume d'auteurs
marxistes autorisés, la formule suivant : "le matérialisme est partie intégrante
du matérialisme dialectique."
125 Althusser, “Marx in His Limits,” 18–33; Althusser, “Marxism Today,” 10–12;
Althusser, “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976),” 262.
126 Lewis, “Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Social Theory (Notes Towards an
Althusserian Critical Theory),” 97–105.
127 Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire,” 22–24.
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materialist approach to Marxist science and to Marxist philosophy in which
both are stripped of their relations to idealist metaphysics.
As with his critique of Marxist philosophy but to a greater extent, the
problem of nomenclature arises with this elaboration. In the case of Marxist
philosophy, Althusser marked the difference between the historical
iterations of Marxist philosophy that he was trying to dismantle and the
philosophy for Marxism that he was in the course of developing in the late
70s by labeling the historical iteration “dialectical materialism” and his
reconstructed materialism variously as “non-philosophy,” “antiphilosophy,” and “philosophy for Marxism.” In the 80s, the designations
for this reconstructed Marxist philosophy grew to include “aleatory
materialism” and “materialism of the encounter.” Though Althusser was not
always consistent in his use of these expressions and often employed the
generic “Marxist philosophy” to refer both to the idealist version of
Marxism he rejected and to the materialist philosophy he was in the course
of developing, the distinction had at least been made. Further, the type of
Marxist philosophy Althusser meant to denote was usually clearly signaled
by context.128 In contrast, whether Althusser referred to the concept of
Marxist science as historically dominated by dialectical materialism or to his
revised version of the concept stripped of its relations to an idealistic
metaphysics, he habitually referred to each by the same names: “Marxist
science” and “historical materialism.”
That Althusser was in the late 1970s critical of historical materialism
and that he argued for an alternative understanding of Marxist science, for
this alternative science’s pursuit, and for its use in political decision making
should have been made clear in Section 2.3. What has not been made
explicit though is exactly of what this reconstructed understanding of
historical materialism consisted. Negatively, we know from Althusser’s
128

Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 173–74, 188–89.
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critique of the relation of Marxist science to dialectical materialism that it is
an idealist mistake to think that: (a) there are general laws of history and (b)
that social relations are determined in the manner that physical relations are
determined.129 We also know from our scrutiny of texts written between
1975 and 1978 that, in Althusser’s reconstruction, historical materialism has
the following positive characteristics. First, it is a science that has for its
object of study the existing forms of class struggle and that has as its goal
the transformation of its object of study. Because of this goal and the
changing structures of its object, it defines and describes itself progressively in
the course of the struggle itself. Second, the characteristics of its object of
study delimit the type of knowledge that it is possible for it to acquire.
Unlike the natural sciences which study the material real and whose findings
(as theoretical representations of universal elements) are or should be
infinitely reproducible, reconstructed historical materialism has as its object
complex historical singularities or “conjunctures.” Under analysis, these
structures reveal tendencies or patterns of relation that endure over time
and which can be said to differentially order and structure these
conjunctures in terms of the way in which a tendency is (or is not) expressed
in relation to the other tendencies that constitute a singular conjuncture.130
In order to gain knowledge of a specific conjuncture, this version of
historical materialism synthesizes the findings of the other (non-critical)
social sciences that it judges to be relevant to understanding the conjuncture
129

Dumenil, Le concept de loi économique dans “Le Capital.”
Although Althusser used this word frequently in his previous work, it is clear that
by 1978 (and probably by Althusser, “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en
philosophie, chapters 1-12 (1976).”) it had taken on this particular meaning in the
context of HM2 analysis. For instance in Althusser, “Que Faire? (1978).” Althusser
writes:
Tout dépend alors de "l'analyse concrète" de la "situation concrète," de la
tendance actuelle de la lutte de classe ouvrière et populaire dan sons
antagonisme avec la lutte de classe bourgeoise, donc de l'analyse concrète de
cet antagonisme qui constitue à la fois la classe bourgeoise en classe
dominante et exploiteuse et la classe ouvrière en classe dominée et exploitée.
130
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and initiates inquiry into those areas where it finds knowledge lacking . In
order to help weed out the influence of bourgeois ideology on these
sciences’ assumptions, methodology, and conclusions, it also subjects this
knowledge to critical scrutiny.131 The result of all of this labor is a synthetic
analysis of the present conjuncture and a concrete political recommendation
for how to transform it. Reflecting the goal and object of the science, the
validity of this result can only be confirmed practically by the
transformation of the very object that it has studied: the existing forms of
the class struggle.132
In the last few paragraphs we have summarized the available
materials in order to detail Althusser’s understanding and endorsement of a
reconstructed historical materialism in the five years prior to 1980. In so
doing, we have shown why any analysis that marks out 1975-80 as a period
of transition away from scientism in Althusser’s thought is incorrect. Not
only do most of the writings from this period evidence an explicit
endorsement of historical materialism, they also position it as a science
separate from any dialectical materialist underpinnings. Though Althusser’s
understanding and endorsement of historical materialism between 1975 and
80 differs in some of its details from its earlier conceptualization (and
particularly that of 1960-1965), his overall position is still recognizably
scientistic in that he continues to mark out science and particularly the
Marxist science of historical materialism as the only human theoretical
practice that allow us to reliably understand socio-economic structures such
that we might intentionally assist in their transformation.
If this summary accurately represents Althusser’s reconstructed
understanding of historical materialism right before the two year break in
131

Althusser, “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire,” 23–23bis.
[Une analyse concrète] ne peut se passer d’une véritable analyse de ces succès
et échecs que mette en lumière leur lien dialectique, et le moyen de
transformer un échec passager en victoire durable.
132 Althusser, “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976).”
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philosophical activity which began in the spring of 1980, then the burden of
proof is yet higher if one hopes to maintain that the 1980s writings on
aleatory materialism are marked by their sudden rejection of scientism. This
is the case as many of the ideas that are associated with Althusser’s
reconstruction of historical materialism clearly appear in the aleatory
materialist writings. We also know that the development of a reconstructed
historical materialism and the beginnings of Althusser’s radical revisions to
Marxist philosophy were simultaneous and that the two projects were
conceptually linked. Therefore, in addition to needing to show that the
positive endorsement of historical materialism disappears in the 80s, one
would also need to show how and why a set of concepts and practices that
were once described by Althussser as constituting a Marxist science
complementary to a reconstructed Marxist philosophy are no longer so
described.
4.2 The explicit endorsement of scientism in Althusser’s later works
As we have seen, due to the lack of positive mentions of Marxist
science in the published texts from the 80s and owing to certain statements
where Althusser wrote negatively about his attempts in the early 1960s to
make Marxist philosophy scientific, a case can be made that Althusser was
in the process of developing a non- or even anti-scientistic Marxist political
philosophy. However, if we look at these writings against the background of
the mid-to late 70s reconstruction of Marxist science and Marxist
philosophy and if we include the additional context provided by Althusser’s
writings between 1982 and 1987 that remain unpublished, we will see that
Althusser never abandoned his scientism and that the endorsement of
scientific practice appears in these works as a continuous and important part
of his political philosophy.
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In order to make these points, this sub-section will examine selected
passages from Althusser’s unpublished writings between 1982 and 1987 that
clearly contradict the theory that he forsook his scientism. Aware that the
mere statement of Althusser’s continued endorsement of Marxist science
does not constitute proof that he remained steadfast in his belief that
science is the only human theoretical practice that allows us to reliably
understand socioeconomic structures such that we might intentionally assist
in their transformation, the sub-section that follows this one will turn to a
reading of published and unpublished writings that illustrates how the
scientific aspect of Althusser’s late thought relates to its philosophical and
political aspects. This illustration will challenge our preliminary account of
how the published materials can be read as evidencing an abandonment of
Althusser’s advocacy of scientific practice for the worker’s movement. It
will do so by giving an explanation for the apparent negative references to
science in these texts.
In the archives at IMEC there are multiple texts from the 1980s in
which Althusser indicates his endorsement of scientific practice and declares
scientific knowledge’s privileged relationship to political change. These texts
also detail the relation of scientific practice to Marxist philosophy. Included
among these texts are unpublished sections of the Interviews with Fernanda
Navarro as well as two long drafts from 1985 and 1986-87 titled “Qu'y
faire? Que faire?” and “Thèses de juin.” The latter two are not only
unambiguous in their endorsement of science and in their assessment of its
efficacy; they also connect this affirmation to the project of aleatory
materialism.133 This connection, along with the less clear-cut but still evident

133

The omission of these texts does not appear to reflect an active intent on the part of
Althusser’s posthumous editors to erase his scientism as it does an attempt on their
part to emphasize the philosophical content of his work and to downplay the often
hallucinatory or prophetic aspects of these texts, aspects which become prominent
when Althusser speaks of current events and their concrete analyses.
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endorsement of science found in the Navarro interviews, will be explored
after citing these texts’ explicit scientistic statements.
Following the model set by Lenin in 1901, both “Qu'y faire? Que
faire?” and “Thèses de juin” resemble a slew of unpublished texts from the
1970s and 1980s in which Althusser reflects on “What Is to Be Done?” in
order to advance communism’s goals. As the complete text of J'écris ce livre en
octobre 1982 contains an evaluation of the present conjuncture along with
specific recommendations for political action, the unfinished book from
which the essay “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the
Encounter” is culled also fits this pattern. Consistently, these “stocktaking”
sorts of pieces are comprised of historical and philosophical reflections,
socio-economic analyses, and strategic recommendations. These exercises
also habitually express Althusser’s judgment that historical materialism is a
science, that it has for its object the class struggle, and that this science must
be pursued if one wishes to arrive at an effective political strategy. For
example, in the introductory section of 1985’s “Qu'y faire? Que faire?,”
Althusser states that a successful long-term political strategy “can only rest
on objective…scientific knowledge” of the present “economic, political, and
ideological conjuncture.” He further stresses that, “in order to achieve this
knowledge” which is, “in the last resort, the analysis of the relations and
forms of class struggle in the present conjuncture and its contradictory
tendencies and its conflicts” we need to have “at our disposal a scientific
theory, one capable of furnishing the abstract-general concepts” that will
allow us to understand the whole of the present conjuncture. Without such
a theory, he maintains, “we remain blind and we fall into political error.” 134

134

Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 2.
Cette stratégie ne peut, en bons principes marxistes et léninistes,
reposer que sur la connaissance objective, c’est-a-dire scientifique (c’est
l’expression même de Lénine sur l’analyse concrète de la situation
« concrète » qui est pour Lénine l’essence du marxisme).
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Written in the summer and edited a few times during the fall or
winter of 1986, “Thèses de juin” may be the last philosophical text to which
Althusser touched a pen. It is certainly his ultimate sustained reflection on
the relation among philosophy, politics, and science. Even at this late date
and in a text that is disarmingly prophetic, Althusser’s endorsement of
scientific knowledge for correct political practice rings clear. In its first
section, Althusser introduces “Thèses de juin” as a piece intended to
“provide a couple of observations that might increase the awareness of men
engaged in the struggle or of those who are waiting for ‘a different
politics’.”135 He then poses a methodological question about how to proceed
to this knowledge, asking whether or not one should begin with “the
concrete analysis of the concrete situation of some country or even of the
world; or, the examination and correction of the theoretical instruments that
permit this analysis.” Because he believes that “the second [path] will be
more difficult but more sure,” Althusser begins the critical section of the
text with some detailed remarks on Marxist philosophy and Marxist science.
After finishing this methodological portion, he then proceeds to what he
labels a markedly “less assured” concrete analysis of the contemporary
political-economic-ideological situation.136 We will return to the preliminary
Cette analyse concrète de la conjoncture économique politique et
l’idéologique, c’est-à-dire en dernier ressort l’analyse des rapports et formes
des luttes de classes dans la conjoncture actuelle et des tendances
contradictoires de ces conflits, ne peut s’effectuer que si on dispose d’une
théorie scientifique …capable de fournir les concepts abstraits-généraux
d’ensemble de l’évolution, non-évolution ou répression de la situation
actuelle, de la conjoncture actuelle. Sans ces concepts aucune « analyse
concrète de la situation concrète » n’est possible. …sans théorie on reste dans
l’aveuglement et on tombe dans l’erreur politique (cf.
135 Althusser, “Thèses de juin,” 1.
Voici néanmoins quelques observations générales qui pourront peut-être aider
à la prise de conscience des hommes engagés dans la lutte…comme des
hommes non engagés dans la lutte mais qui attendent une « autre politique ».
136 Ibid., 2. A charitable reader of this analysis would recognize it as the musings of a
shut-in who has access to a television and to some newspapers but not to scientific
materials. An uncharitable reader might label it hallucinatory, paranoid, and overlyoptimistic.
50
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

50

Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

methodological remarks on Marxist philosophy and Marxist science below.
However, it is important to note here that, in the theoretical section of one
of his last texts, Althusser continues to insist that it is only “historical
materialism” and its body of “scientific concepts” that “permits a concrete
analysis of the concrete situation”137
4.3 Aleatory materialism and Marxist science: theory for Marxism
As mentioned above, “Qu'y faire? Que faire?” and “Thèses de juin”
as well as unpublished sections of the Interviews with Fernanda Navarro are
doubly remarkable. These texts do not merely endorse Marxist science and
link its practice directly to political efficacy; all three also contain explicit
passages detailing the relation among aleatory materialist philosophy,
scientific practice, and political practice. As supplements and corrections to
the published materials, these writings make it clear that aleatory materialism
in the 1980s represents the positive side to the critical project of the mid-to
late 1970s when Althusser endeavored to purge Marxist philosophy and
historical materialism of idealist elements. Indeed, Althusser unambiguously
confirms this reading of the project in an unpublished section of the
Ici, deux voies s’ouvrent devant nous :
–ou bien l’analyse concrète de la situation concrète de tel pays ou
même du monde
-ou bien l’examen et la rectification des instruments théoriques
permettant cette analyse.
La première voie serait plus facile mais moins assurée. La seconde voie sera
plus difficile mais plus sûre. Je choisis donc la deuxième voie.
137 Ibid.
A Marx nous devons des concepts scientifiques irremplaçables,
comme les concepts de mode de production, de forces productives, de rapport
de production, de marchandise, d’échange, de consommation, de capital fixe,
de capital variable, de exploitation économique, de dictature d’Etat, des vues
sur l’action révolutionnaire des masses, sur l’avenir inéluctable du
communisme etc. etc.
Ce sont là –et je ne cite que les principaux–des concepts scientifiques
relevant de ce que la tradition marxiste désigne sous le nom de matérialisme
historique, corpus de concepts permettant une analyse concrète de la situation
concrète.
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Navarro interview where he states that the aleatory materialist conceptions
of philosophy and of scientific practice represent “precisions” of his earlier
ideas rather than their rejection.138 In the next few paragraphs, we will
explain what Althusser meant by precisions and how these refinements
relate to his earlier work. We will also clear up any lingering misconception
that Althusser renounced his scientism in his later work.
It is easier to understand the precisions made to Althusser’s Marxist
theory in the 1980s if one takes into account his consistent and overarching
understanding of Marxism as well as the impetus for these adjustments.
Fundamentally, Althusser saw Marxism as a political movement whose goal
is the revolutionary transformation of existing socio-economic practices into
communist ones. As a philosopher and a committed Marxist, he put much
effort into working out exactly how theoretical and political practices should
be related in order to achieve the goals of the Marxist movement. 139 This
focus comes through in most of the published work after 1966 and it is
pronounced in the “Marxist manuals” authored between 1966 and 1978 and
of which Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes is a late example.
Althusser’s consistent effort to relate theory and practice in such a way as to
attain the goals of the Marxist movement is also unmistakable in the series
of stock-taking pieces from the 1970s and 1980s mentioned above where he
goes from philosophical reflections on Marxist philosophy and Marxist
science to methodological and procedural recommendations for party
policies and procedures that will best allow it to analyze the contemporary
“concrete situation” and to politically act successfully in relation to this
knowledge.
138

Althusser, “Philosophie et marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 47.
… je parie que la même méprise va se reproduire avec les précisions
radicales que j’apporte maintenant, toujours dans la même ligne, à mes thèses
anciennes. [J]e n’ai jamais changé de ligne théorique et politique, même si
j’ai rectifié, en les affinant, quelques formules, provisoirement définitive.
139 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 51.
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Stated simply, the impetus for most of Althusser’s political
philosophical output is his consistent belief that correct practice flows from
correct theory.140 If Marxist practice is not doing well in a specific
conjuncture and if Marxist practice flows from Marxist theory, then it
follows from this belief and this judgment that a new theorization of how
the socioeconomic world works and how to change it is a pressing problem
for the Marxist movement. Given this basic supposition, one way to make
sense of Althusser’s career is as a series of reactions to practical (and
therefore theoretical) crises in the Marxist movement. First there is the crisis
of Stalinism, then that of Humanism, then that of Eurocommunism. Finally,
after 1981, there is the problem of the rapid decline of the French
Communist Party as a political power. During each crisis, Althusser worked
to develop an alternative understanding of Marxist theory that he believed
to be materialist and correct. As a body, this theory included positions on
Marxist philosophy, Marxist science, and Marxist organization. Taking stock
of the philosophical, political, ideological, economic, and theoretical
conjuncture at each moment of crisis, Althusser positioned this
reconstructed theory in contradistinction to a hegemonic or nascent Marxist
theory that he believed to be incorrect and idealist.
If we acknowledge Althusser’s overall understanding of Marxism as
well as the impetus for his successive interventions into Marxist theory, it is
clear that the common thread which links the Marxist manuals, balance
sheets, and many of the published works is that all represent critiques and
revisions to existing Marxist theory that are written in order to better enable
Marxist practice to achieve Marxist goals. If we then connect Althusser’s
consistent belief that correct practice flows from correct theory with these
ideas about theory and especially with his understanding of philosophy as a
140

Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, 111–112; Althusser and Matheron, The
Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, 1966-67, 297; Althusser, “Philosophie et
marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 48.
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perpetual battle between materialist and idealist tendencies, then we can
better see what Althusser was up to the with his critique of dialectical
materialism and his reconstruction of historical materialism in the late
1970s.141 More directly and for the purposes of this section of the paper, we
can also better understand Althusser’s development of a new Marxist
philosophy, aleatory materialism in the 1980s. In this light, the “texts of the
crisis,” “Marx in his Limits” and “Marxism Today,” can be recognized as
attempts to weed out those elements in Marx’s or Marxism’s philosophy
that are idealist and to distinguish these elements from the materialist ones.
Similarly illuminated by these connections, “The Underground Current of
the Materialism of the Encounter,” and “Philosophy and Marxism” can be
seen as attempts to reconstruct a Marxist philosophy without or with less
idealist elements and for the then-present conjuncture.142 As we have shown
above, this “new” or unearthed materialist philosophy does not include a
rejection of Marxist science. Instead, it is specifically proposed as a
philosophy for a Marxist theory that, at its inauguration, lacked a philosophy
and “was basically scientific in nature” 143 It was also meant to critique and
replace that other “Marxist philosophy,” dialectical materialism, which had
filled in the gaps in Marx’s theory with idealist concepts and whose adoption
and development had lead to such unfortunate results for the Marxist
movement.144 Finally, it was meant as a philosophy for the Marxist
movement during a time in which the communist political movement was in

141

Althusser, “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968),” 18; Althusser, Philosophy and
the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, 1161986191919;
Althusser, “Du Matérialisme Aléatoire (1986),” 184.
142 Quote from “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,”
about how this is written so he can say something about Marx.
143 Althusser, “Philosophy and Marxism: Interviews with Fernanda Navarro (198487),” 257.
144 Ibid., 254.
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decline in France and in Europe but where smaller communist movements
showed promise in other areas.145
4.4 The relation between aleatory materialism and Marxist science
This section of the paper will not argue that the materialism of the
encounter meets the goal that Althusser set for it of being a philosophy that
can successfully battle the idealist notions of dialectical materialism and
replace them with a set of theses about the world and its relations that, if
adopted, might better allow for the success of the global Marxist movement.
Like Bourdin, Sotiris, Suchting, and Tosel, we think that aleatory
materialism contains some interesting ideas and that it is worth exploring
and developing.146 However, we also agree with these and other
commentators that much of this work is sloppy and often delirious, that it is
rife with paradoxes and contradictory claims, and that the misreadings of
the philosophers it brings in to support its ideas detract from its virtues.147
This sub-section of the paper will also not try to correct these faults, to
explain these shortcomings, or to give an account of aleatory materialism’s
contents. Instead, it will merely try to suggest what Althusser meant when
he argued in his later writings that Marxism is a science and to show how
this science relates to the philosophy of aleatory materialism. Its thesis is
this: aleatory materialism is the philosophical part of a body of Marxist

145

Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 22.
Quoi donc nous attend ? Eh bien comme les petits dieux d’Epicure dans les
« interstices » des sociétés antiques, ce qui nous attend ce sont des
« interstices de communisme » dans les pores de nôtres propre société
capitaliste- impérialiste- interimpérialiste mondiale.
146 Bourdin, “The Uncertain Materialism of Louis Althusser”; Sotiris, “Philosophy of
the Encounter”; Suchting, “Althusser’s Late Thinking about Materialism”; Tosel,
“Les Aléas Du Matérialisme Aléatoire Dans La Dernière Philosophie de Louis
Althusser.”
147 Bourdin, “Ce que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme (et à la philosophie),”
59; Tosel, “The Hazards of Aleatory Materialism in the Late Philosophy of Louis
Althusser”; Sotiris, “Contradictions of Aleatory Materialism.”
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theory that also includes ideological, philosophical, political, and scientific
components. As the philosophical component of Marxist theory it is not
meant to replace Marxist science but to complement it. It complements this
movement as a whole by seeking to remove from Marxist philosophy the
idealist notions that prevent the Marxist movement from having access to
scientific knowledge about the world and to replace them with concepts that
facilitate the gathering of such knowledge. Althusser’s hope was that this
knowledge could allow the Marxist movement to overcome ideological
notions about what is to be done and to develop a correct political line, a
line which allows for the world’s and that movement’s own practical
transformation.
As we have seen, the relationship between the Marxist philosophy of
aleatory materialism and the Marxist science of historical materialism is
obscured by the editorial choices made during the publication of Althusser’s
posthumous works. Despite not being especially visible in the published
work, the nature of the relationship between the materialism of the
encounter and Marxist science was nevertheless clear to at least one
attentive reader, Jean-Claude Bourdin. In a 2012 book chapter titled “Ce
que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme,” Bourdin notices that
Althusser describes aleatory materialism as an "assiette," as a serving plate
on which correct (i.e. politically efficacious) ideas about philosophy, science
and politics can be constructed.148 In this understanding, aleatory
materialism is not presented primarily as the launching of new political
ontology, one which establishes the ever-present possibility of an aleatory
reconfiguration of politics. Instead, aleatory materialism is recognized by
148

Bourdin, “Ce que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme (et à la philosophie),”

63.
…on dira qu’une « assiette » représente un ensemble de catégories les plus
générales, indépendantes de l’expérience de toute preuve expérimentale, qui
énonce des propositions sur la structure et le devenir du monde (ou de la
nature) et sur la forme que doit prendre la pensée pour parvenir à ces énoncés.
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Bourdin as “a group of general categories, the most general, which are
independent of experience and of all experimental proof, and which state
some proposition on the structure and the becoming of the world (or of
nature) and on the form that thought must take to arrive at these
statements.”149 Just as we have argued above, Bourdin contends that this set
of categories is meant to replace the dialectical materialist assumptions that
have failed both Marxist science and Marxist politics. As such, these
categories are offered as a basic set of propositions about the world that
might enable the Marxist movement to understand the historical
conjuncture such that it can direct its transformation.150 These propositions
are not meant to directly replace scientific concepts (though they may end
up suggesting that certain “scientific concepts” are not scientific). Instead,
they are offered as general categories upon which scientific investigations
may be based, ones that will allow the Marxist movement to understand
new conjunctures and unexpected conditions.151
Bourdin builds up his case for this understanding of aleatory
materialism in a compelling manner: first by showing how the ontological
and voluntarist readings of the materialism of the encounter are problematic
and then by linking Althusser’s description of aleatory materialism as an
“assiette” to his insistence that aleatory materialism is a materialist
philosophy for Marxism and not a materialist philosophy or ontology. 152
However compelling, this reading has the disadvantage of being mostly
speculative and of departing from a few suggestions dropped by Althusser
in the published texts. Fortunately, the texts that corroborate this assertion
were written and they exist in Althusser’s archive. As we have noted above,
“Qu'y faire? Que faire?” and “Thèses de juin” as well as sections of the

149

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
151 Ibid.,
152 Ibid.,
150
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Interviews with Fernanda Navarro include specific endorsements of Marxist
science and of historical materialism. In addition, in more or less lucid
fashion, each provides confirmation of Bourdin’s assertion that aleatory
materialism is intended as an instrumentalist ontology that can ground
Marxist science and thereby ground Marxist practice in the particular
historical conjuncture that was the early 1980s. This Marxist philosophy can
be said to be “true” or more correct than dialectical materialism insofar as
its ideas about the political world in its constitution and disintegration
inform and allow Marxist science to proceed in such a way that Marxist
strategy can be successful.
I will start with “Qu'y faire? Que faire?” as an example of a text
which corroborates Bourdin’s assertion that aleatory materialism is a
materialist philosophy for Marxism, one that enables the Marxist movement
to understand the historical conjuncture such that it might direct its
transformation. After beginning this strategic piece with an impassioned call
for a historical materialist analysis of the contemporary situation, Althusser
then proceeds to bemoan the fact that “no one in the world is capable of
providing the least ‘concrete analysis’ of the conjuncture” or “of conceiving
any strategy.”153 He attributes this incapacity to the
general abandonment of Marxist theory, the only [theory] in
history which has given itself the means for the analysis of a
economico-politico-ideological conjuncture and its aleatory
becoming. There exists no comprehensive theory of the world
capable of trying to think the actual conjuncture and not only
the long-term tendencies but even the medium and short term
‘evolution’ or regression of this conjuncture. 154
153

Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 13.
Et comme personne au monde n’est en état de fournir la moindre « analyse
concrète » de la conjoncture, personne au monde, même les tout-puissants
USA et leurs dirigeant, n’est capable de concevoir la moindre stratégie.
154 Ibid., 13–14.
…depuis l’abandon généralisé de la théorie marxiste, la seule qui se soit
donné dans l’histoire les moyens de l’analyse d’une conjoncture économicopolitico- idéologique et de son devenir aléatoire, [???] il n’existe aucune
théorie d’ensemble au monde capable de tenter de penser la conjoncture
58
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In this grievance and in Althusser’s explanation of the situation that led to
this impasse we see marked out the relation between philosophy, science,
and political strategy. At its most general, this quote tells us, Marxist theory
provides or provided us with a “comprehensive theory of the world.” This
theory renders us “capable of trying to think the actual conjuncture” and its
tendencies and it permits a historical materialist analysis of the present
economico-politico-ideological situation and the possibilities for this
situation’s transformation.
In a more confrontational tone, the relationship within Marxist
theory between philosophy and science is also concisely described in
“Thèses de juin” and “Philosophy and Marxism.” In the interview,
Althusser concludes a response to a question about his antihumanism and
the reasons for this position with the statement “we at last understand why
it is indispensable to know, and know scientifically what the ideological class
struggle is in order to at last understand what ideology is. And if one has
followed me, one will also have understood in what manner materialist
philosophy is indispensable for understanding the ideological struggle.”155 In
this summary statement Althusser signals that Marxist philosophy is a
comprehensive theory of the world, a theory that is not identical to scientific
knowledge. Short of being identical to it, this philosophy is that part of
Marxist theory that provides the conceptual categories that allow us to
pursue scientific studies.

actuelle et la (ou les) tendances non pas à long termes mais même à moyen et
court terme d’«évolution » ou de régression de cette conjoncture
155 Althusser, “Philosophie et marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,” 48.
Je m’arrête, – mais pour réponde à la question posée, on comprend enfin
pourquoi il est indispensable de bien savoir, et d’un savoir scientifique ce
qu’est la lutte de classe idéologique, pour enfin comprendre ce qu’est
l’idéologie. Et on m’a bien suivi, on aura aussi compris en quoi la philosophie
matérialiste est indispensable pour comprendre la lutte idéologique
59
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What is this “center for theoretical thought and therefore the
possibility of explaining the conjuncture and its evolutionary tendencies?”156
Well, after asking a similar question in “Thèses de juin” about “what
theoretical instruments are at our disposition for the analysis of a concrete
historical situation, either in one country or in the world,” Althusser first
entertains the idea that the “bourgeois theory of society” can provide such a
center. He rejects this possibility, however, because “the weakness of these
theoretical elements is their being rooted in a bad philosophy, whether it be
subjectivist-idealist, positivist, or structuralist…” 157 With Marx though,
Althusser opines, “we owe irreplaceable scientific concepts…falling within
what the Marxist tradition designates under the name historical materialism, a
corpus of concepts permitting a concrete analysis of the concrete
situation.158 Does this mean that historical materialism is this center, the
“assiette,” on which correct ideas can be constructed? No, on the contrary
and despite the recognition of historical materialism’s necessity and power,
Althusser does not recommend historical materialist concepts as the center
for theoretical thought. Instead, he explains that these “scientific concepts
are only valuable on the foundation of a correct philosophy and that…we can
only make use of them under the correct orientation that this correct
156

Althusser, “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” 14.
Nous nous trouvons donc exactement dans la situation que Machiavel décrit à
propos de l’Italie : les moyennes humaines et matériels sont là des hommes
capables à l’infini innombrables intelligents et vivants, n’attendant qu’une
stratégie pour s’y engager, mais il leur manque un centre de pensée théorique
donc de possibilité d’explication de la conjoncture et de ses tendances
évolutives
157 Althusser, “Thèses de juin,” 2.
Il y a beaucoup de concepts intéressants à emprunter à la théorie bourgeoise
de la société. On pourra les examiner en une autre occasion. La faiblesse de
ces éléments théoriques est leur enracinement dans une mauvaise philosophie,
soit subjectivistes- idéalistes, soit positivistes, soit structuralistes
158 Ibid.
A Marx nous devons des concepts scientifiques irremplaçables… Ce sont là –
et je ne cite que les principaux–des concepts scientifiques relevant de ce que la
tradition marxiste désigne sous le nom de matérialisme historique, corpus de
concepts permettant une analyse concrète de la situation concrète
60
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philosophy confers.159 What is this philosophy? A few paragraphs later,
Althusser writes, “the true materialism that is suitable to Marxism is aleatory
materialism.”160
4.5 Making sense of the anti-scientistic statements
If by this survey of Althusser’s published and unpublished texts from
the 1980s we have demonstrated that Althusser did not abandon his
scientism and that this belief appears in his later work as a continuous and
important part of his philosophy then we have yet to account for the
seemingly anti-scientistic statements in the published work on the
materialism of the encounter. Based on what we have established though,
this accounting should not be hard to do. We can now take it as established
that Althusser never abandoned Marxist science but that he did engage in its
reconstruction in the 1970s. Further, we know that this reconstruction was
directly related to a thoroughgoing critique of dialectical materialism and to
the positive development of a new version of Marxist philosophy, a
philosophy that eventually came to be called aleatory materialism or the
materialism of the encounter. In addition, we know that choices made by
Althusser’s editors resulted in the expurgation of most of the comments
where Althusser clearly indicates the necessity of scientific practice for
political transformation.161 If we acknowledge all this, then we can see
159

Ibid., 2–3.
…des concepts scientifiques ne sont valables que sur le fond d’une
philosophie juste et que d’une certaine manière on ne peut les utiliser que sous
la juste orientation que leur confère cette philosophie juste »

160

Ibid., 4.
In the editorial remarks that accompany the publication of “Of Marxist Thought
(1982), Haider and Mohandesi notice this absent presence, remarking:
The vocabulary we have come to associate with Althusser is nowhere to be
found: science, ideology, problematic, epistemological rupture, materialism,
and so forth are all terms which are either entirely absent or thoroughly emptied of their former theoretical connotations. But while the language in which
it is told has certainly changed, the objective of the story seems to be the
161
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Althusser’s admission in the letter to Merab Mardashvili that he had in the
early 1960s “fabricated a little, typically French justification…for
Marxism's…pretension to being a science”162 as a critique of the justification
for Marxism's pretension to being a science rather than as a disavowal of the
belief that “something in Marxism is scientific.” What has changed by the
late 1970s is not the belief that historical materialism is a science but the
justification for why Althusser understood it to be so. Whereas formerly
Althusser had believed there was a rationalist justification for Marxism’s
pretensions, by 1978 and the writing of the letter to Mardashvili, the
justification for Marxism’s status as a science had become practical or
pragmatic in the technical sense of the term.163
This change in the justification of Althusser’s belief that an important
part of Marxist theory is scientific also explains Althusser’s statement from
the Navarro interview that materialist philosophy “does not claim to be
autonomous or to ground its own origin and its own power. Nor does it
consider itself to be a science, and still less the Science of sciences.”164 As we
have seen, Althusser did not consider materialist philosophy to be
autonomous because its status as a materialism depends on how it relates to
other philosophies competing for theoretical space at a particular historical
conjuncture; its contents are therefore historically contingent. Similarly, it is
neither itself a science nor can it be the Theoretical Science that polices the
other sciences. Instead, materialist philosophy in Althusser’s aleatory
materialist reconstruction is presented as a set of general judgments about
the world that allow the sciences and particularly the science of historical
materialism to proceed and to constitute itself. Materialist philosophy is not
same: to discover what must be brought to life from the tortuous history of the
thought of Marx and Engels.
See : Haider and Mohandesi, “Underground Currents.”
162 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 3.
163 Baltas, “Critical Notice,” 655.
164 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 274.
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science nor is materialist science a philosophy of the encounter. Both,
however, are complementary parts of a larger Marxist theory.165 In a similar
fashion, the larger context we have provided in our account allows us to
understand that the editorial advice given by Althusser in a letter to Navarro
in 1986 to drop the bits about science and ideology from the interview
cannot possibly be motivated by a denial of the possibility of making a
distinction between the two types of theory or by an abandonment of
Marxist science. Instead, we should take Althusser at his word that “[t]hat
section is not ready yet, and ought to be rewritten.”166
Of the seemingly anti-scientistic statements made by Althusser, there
remains the Navarro interview where Althusser stated that the objects of
Marxism and psychoanalysis “belong not to accomplished history but to
Geschichte, to living history, which is made of, and wells up out of, aleatory
tendencies and the unconscious. This is a history whose forms have nothing
to do with the determinism of physical laws.” 167 Though there is not space
to go into a full explanation of this statement here, we should note that
Althusser does not write that there cannot be a science of history, only that
the objects of history do not act in a deterministic manner, as do physical
objects. This recognition does not mean that there is no science of history;
just that history cannot be a science of objects characterized by their
adherence to certain invariable, deterministic laws. Indeed, as we have
argued in another paper, to go from the statement that history does not
work according to the determinism of physical laws to the assertion that
Althusser rejects a science of history can only be done by ignoring the
consistent contrast Althusser makes between natural laws and the social
scientific laws of which historical laws are a subset. One can also only make

165

Althusser, “Philosophy and Marxism: Interviews with Fernanda Navarro (198487),” 22.
166 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 287.
167 Ibid., 264.
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such an assertion if one ignores Althusser’s decades-long campaign against
dialectical materialism for its insistence that historical laws and physical laws
are identical in terms of their both being instances of the fundamental
dialectical law of nature.168 In short, this quote does not so much reveal the
abandonment of Marxist science as it does the fruits of historical
materialism’s reconstruction as a non-teleological science that examines
existing historical tendencies in the complexity of their contingent
interactions and for the possibility of their adjustment or transformation.
Conclusion
Using both published and unpublished texts, this essay has provided
a diachronic examination of Althusser’s understanding of Marxist theory
and of the relations among philosophy, science, ideology and political
change at different periods of his career. It has shown that, even with all the
changes, precisions, and reconstructions to this theory’s component parts
and to his thoughts about these parts’ interrelations, Althusser has
consistently maintained that scientific practice tends to replace existing ideas
about the social and natural world and to generate new knowledge about
these interactions which, insofar as it is correct, conduces to these relations’
transformation. By demonstrating that the reading of Althusser which finds
in his conception of the relations between science, philosophy, and politics a
pronounced continuity as well as pronounced scientism, it has also
challenged those who insist upon a differentiation between an earlier,
scientistic Althusser and a later, ontological one. A corollary to this finding
is that it is now more difficult to forge a connection between Althusser and
certain contemporary political philosophers who abandon historical
materialism and the social sciences and who look to ontology in order to
suggest the possibility of political transformation. In addition, the correction
168

Lewis, “Althusser on Laws Natural and Juridical,” 39.
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of the misunderstanding that Althusser abandoned his scientism in his later
works allows us to view this later philosophy in a more charitable light. No
longer is it necessary to assess aleatory materialism against other, more
sophisticated, less contradictory, and more fully realized ontologies. Now,
we can judge the materialism of the encounter as Althusser seems to have
intended, pragmatically, in terms of how well it works with Marxist science
to produce practical knowledge advantageous to our political
transformation. Finally, if one agrees with Althusser about the relation
between aleatory materialism and Marxist science, it becomes less easy to
overestimate the role played by philosophy in understanding and
encouraging revolutionary transitions. It should also encourage us to return
to the scientific study of our socio-economico-political conjuncture, its
tendencies, and of how we can intervene so as to transform these conditions
and relations.
Works Cited
Althusser, Louis. Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes. Edited by G.
M. Goshgarian. [Paris]: Presses universitaires de France, 2013.
———. “«La philosophie c’est enfantin».,” 86 1985. Fonds Althusser.
Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “«Sur le mode de production»,” summer 1982. Fonds Althusser.
Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “AL T2. A46-04.05, Entretien avec Giorgio Fanti,” April 1980.
Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “ALT2. A7-01.09 <<Théorie Marxiste et Parti Communiste>>
(<<Union théorie/pratique>>). (1966-1967),” 1967 1966. Fonds
Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “ALT2. A22-01.02, Texte de Louis Althusser sur la philosophie
marxiste,” June 1975. Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires de
l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “ALT2. A25-01.02, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 1-12
(1976),” 1976. Fonds Althusser. L’Institut Mémoires de l’Édition
Contemporaine.
———. “ALT2. A25-01.03, Être marxiste en philosophie, chapters 13-24
(1976),” 1976. Fonds Althusser. L’Institut Mémoires de l’Édition
Contemporaine.
65
Published by OxyScholar, 2016

65

Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22

———. “Cremonini, peintre de l’abstrait (1964-66).” In Ecrits philosophiques
et politiques, Tome 2, edited by François Matheron, 573–90. Ecrits
philosophiques et politiques. Paris: Stock IMEC, 1995.
———. “Du Matérialisme Aléatoire (1986).” Multitudes, no. 2 (2005): 179–
94.
———. Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 2. Edited by François
Matheron. Ecrits philosophiques et politiques. Paris: Stock IMEC,
1995.
———. “Elements of Self-Criticism.” In Essays in Self-Criticism, 105–50.
London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: NLB ; Humanities Press, 1976.
———. Essays in Self-Criticism. London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: NLB ;
Humanities Press, 1976.
———. “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy.” In Reading “Capital”,.
London: NLB, 1970.
———. “La grande répétition de l’histoire,” summer 1982. Fonds
Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “La transformation de la philosophie – Conférence de Grenade
(1976).” In Sur la philosophie, 139–78. L’infini. Paris: Gallimard, 1994.
———. Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1972.
———. “Lenin and Philosphy (February 1968).” In Lenin and Philosophy, and
Other Essays., 23–70. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
———. “Les Vâches noires : interview imaginaire,” 1977 1976. Fonds
Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “Letter to the Central Committee of the PCF, 18 March 1966.”
Historical Materialism 15, no. 2 (2007): 153–72.
———. Machiavelli and Us. Edited by Gregory Elliot. Verso, 1999.
———. “Marx in His Limits.” In Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings,
1978-87, 7–162. Verso, 2006.
———. “Marxism Today.” In Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the
Scientists & Other Essays, edited by Gregory Elliott, 267–80. London;
New York: Verso, 1990.
———. “On Levi-Strauss.” In The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings,
1966-67, edited by François Matheron, 19–33. London; New York:
Verso, 2003.
———. On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses, 2014.
———. “On the Young Marx: Theoretical Quetions (1961).” In For Marx.
London; New York: Verso, 2005.
———. “Ouvrage sans titre commençant par : «J’écris ce livre en octobre
1982».,” 1982. Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition
Contemporaine.

66
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

66

Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

———. “Philosophie et marxisme. Entretiens avec Fernanda Navarro,”
June 16, 1986. Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition
Contemporaine.
———. Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants, 1967. Paris: F. Maspero,
1974.
———. “Philosophy and Marxism: Interviews with Fernanda Navarro
(1984-87).” In Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87, 251–
89. Verso, 2006.
———. Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays .
Edited by Gregory Elliott. London; New York: Verso, 1990.
———. Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87. Verso, 2006.
———. “Projet de livre sur l’impérialisme. 1973,” n.d. Fonds Althusser.
Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “Qu’y faire ? Que faire ?,” May 30, 1985. Fonds Althusser.
L’Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “Que Faire? (1978),” 1978. Fonds Althusser. L’Institut Mémoires
de l’Édition Contemporaine.
———. “Reply to John Lewis.” In Essays in Self-Criticism, 33–100. London;
Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: NLB ; Humanities Press, 1976.
———. “Sur Brecht et Marx (1968).” In Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome
2, edited by François Matheron, 541–58. Ecrits philosophiques et
politiques. Paris: Stock IMEC, 1995.
———. Sur la philosophie. L’infini. Paris: Gallimard, 1994.
———. Sur la reproduction. Actuel Marx confrontation. Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1995.
———. “The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy (1967).” In The
Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, 1966-67, edited by François
Matheron, 155–220. London; New York: Verso, 2003.
———. “The Transformation of Philosophy (1976).” In Philosophy and the
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, edited by Gregory
Elliott, 241–66. London; New York: Verso, 1990.
———. “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology
and Ideological Struggle.” In Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of
the Scientists & Other Essays, translated by Gregory Elliott, 1–42.
London; New York: Verso, 1990.
———. “Thèses de juin,” 1987 1986. Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires
de l’Édition Contemporaine.
Althusser, Louis, and Etienne Balibar. Reading “Capital.” London: NLB,
1970.
Althusser, Louis, and François Matheron. The Humanist Controversy and Other
Writings, 1966-67. London; New York: Verso, 2003.
Althusser, Louis. “Cours sur le mode d’exposition chez Marx,” March 1978.
Fonds Althusser. Institut Mémoires de l’Édition Contemporaine.

67
Published by OxyScholar, 2016

67

Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22

Amariglio, Jack J. “Marxism against Economic Science : Althusser’s
Legacy.” Research in Political Economy 10 (1987): 159–94.
Badiou, Alain. “Can Change Be Thought? (interview).” In Badiou and Politics,
289–317. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
Balibar, Etienne. “Tais-toi, Althusser! (1988).” In Ecrits pour Althusser, 59–89.
Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1991.
Baltas, Aristides. “Critical Notice: Louis Althusser’s Philosophy and the
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays.”
Philosophy of Science 60, no. 4 (1993): 647–58.
Bargu, Banu. “In the Theater of Politics: Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism
and Aesthetics.” Diacritics 40, no. 3 (2012): 86–113.
Beaulieu, Alain. “La Politique de Gilles Deleuze et Le Matérialisme Aléatoire
Du Dernier Althusser˚.” Actuel Marx, no. 2 (2003): 161–74.
———. “La politique de Gilles Deleuze et le matérialisme aléatoire du
dernier Althusser˚.” Actuel Marx n° 34, no. 2 (September 1, 2003):
161–74. doi:10.3917/amx.034.0161.
Bensaïd, Daniel. “Un univers de pensée aboli.” In Contre Althusser : Pour
Marx. Nouvelle édition, augmentée, 229–63, 1999.
Boer, Roland. “Althusser’s Catholic Marxism.” Rethinking Marxism 19, no. 4
(October 2007): 469–86,557.
Bourdin, Jean-Claude. “Ce que fait la rencontre aléatoire au matérialisme (et
à la philosophie).” In Autour d’Althusser: penser un matérialisme aléatoire :
problèmes et perspectives, edited by Annie Ibrahim, 54–82. Paris: Temps
des cerises, 2012.
———. “The Uncertain Materialism of Louis Althusser.” Graduate Faculty
Philosophy Journal 22, no. 1 (2010): 271–87.
Bryant, Levi R, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman. The Speculative Turn:
Continental Materialism and Realism. Melbourne, [Victoria] Australia:
re.press, 2011.
Cangiani, Michele. “Althusser and the Critique of Political Economy.” In
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical
Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Cavazzini, Andrea. Crise du marxisme et critique de l’État: le dernier combat
d’Althusser ; [suivi de L’État, le marxisme, le communisme : un débat entre
Althusser et Poulantzas]. [Reims]: le Clou dans le fer, 2009.
Day, Ronald E. “The Aleatory Encounter and the Common Name Reading
Negri Reading Althusser.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 35, no. 4
(2011): 362–69.
Del Lucchese tr. Warren Montag, Filippo. “On the Emptiness of an
Encounter: Althusser’s Reading of Machiavelli.” Décalages 1, no. 1
(February 16, 2010). http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol1/iss1/5.

68
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

68

Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

Diefenbach, Katja. “Althusser with Deleuze: How to Think Spinoza’s
Immanent Cause.” In Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in
Contemporary Radical Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Dosse, Francois. History of Structuralism. Vol. 1: The Rising Sign : 1945-1966.
Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
Dumenil, Gérard. Le concept de loi économique dans “Le Capital.” Paris: F.
Maspero, 1977.
Elliott, Gregory. Althusser: The Detour of Theory. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006.
———. “Introduction: In the Mirror of Machiavelli.” In Machiavelli and Us,
edited by Gregory Elliott, xi–xxii. London New York: Verso, 1999.
———. “Postscript: The Necessity of Contingency.” In Althusser: The Detour
of Theory, 317–72. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden; Boston:
Brill, n.d.
Fernández Liria, Pedro. “Regreso al <<Campo de Batalla>>.” In Para un
materialismo aleatorio, 73–125. Madrid: Arena Libros, 2002.
Garo, Isabelle. “<<Il Pleut>> – Matérialisme de la rencontre et politique
du vide chez le dernier Althusser.” In Autour d’Althusser: penser un
matérialisme aléatoire : problèmes et perspectives, edited by Annie Ibrahim,
164–86. Paris: Temps des cerises, 2012.
———. “The Impossible Break: Ideology in Movement between
Philosophy and Politics.” In Encountering Althusser: Politics and
Materialism in Contemporary Radical Thought. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2013.
George, François. “Reading Althusser.” Telos 1971, no. 7 (March 20, 1971):
73–98. doi:10.3817/0371007073.
Gillot, Pascale. “Althusser, Wittgenstein, et la question du sujet.” In Autour
d’Althusser: penser un matérialisme aléatoire : problèmes et perspectives, edited
by Annie Ibrahim, 122–44. Paris: Temps des cerises, 2012.
Goshgarian, G M. “The Very Essence of the Object, the Soul of Marxism
and Other Singular Things: Spinoza in Althusser 1959-67.” In
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical
Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Goshgarian, G. M. “Introduction.” In The Humanist Controversy and Other
Writings, 1966-67, xi–lxi. London; New York: Verso, 2003.
———. “Translator’s Introduction.” In Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the
Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87, xiii–l. Verso, 2006.
Haack, Susan. “Six Signs of Scientism.” Logos & Episteme: An International
Journal of Epistemology 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 75–95.
Haider, Asad, and Salar Mohandesi. “Underground Currents: Louis
Althusser’s ‘On Marxist Thought.’” Viewpoint Magazine. Accessed
June 6, 2014. http://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/undergroundcurrents-louis-althussers-on-marxist-thought/.

69
Published by OxyScholar, 2016

69

Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22

Henninger, Max. “Facticity and Contingency in Louis Althusser’s Aleatory
Materialism.” Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 18 (January 1,
2007): 34–59.
Ichida, Yoshihiko, and Fran\ccois Matheron. “Un, Deux, Trois, Quatre,
Dix Mille Althusser?” Multitudes, no. 2 (2005): 167–78.
Illas, Edgar. “The Procrustean Bed of Class Struggle.” Décalages 1, no. 3
(2013): 2.
Johnston, Adrian. “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with
Zizek.” In Zizek Now: Current Perspectives in Zizek Studies, edited by
Jamil Khader and Molly Anne Rothenberg, 103–20. John Wiley &
Sons, 2013.
Kirn, Gal. “Between the Tenth and Eleventh Theses on Feuerbach:
Althusser’s Return to the New Materialism.” In Encountering Althusser:
Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical Thought. New York:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Lahtinen, Mikko. Politics and Philosophy: Niccolo Machiavelli and Louis Althusser’s
Aleatory Materialism. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009.
http://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=fAKGR24Ua4wC&oi
=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=althusser+aleatory+materialism&ots=aBHL2he
ydf&sig=ene9XOuqMp31hLzZvpRGrM9SjMk.
Lewis, William S. “Concrete Analysis and Pragmatic Social Theory (Notes
Towards an Althusserian Critical Theory).” International Studies in
Philosophy 39, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 97–116.
Lewis, William S. “Althusser on Laws Natural and Juridical.” In Althusser and
Law, edited by Laurent Desutter, 33–48. Nomikoi Critical Legal
Thinkers Series. Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2013.
———. “‘Editorial Introduction to Louis Althusser’s “Letter to the Central
Committee of the PCF, 18 March, 1966”.’” Historical Materialism 15,
no. 2 (2007): 20.
Macherey, Pierre. “Althusser et Le Concept de Philosophie Spontanée Des
Savants.” CNRS–Universités de Lille 3 et 1, 2008.
Matheron, Francois. “The Recurrence of the Void in Louis Althusser.”
Translated by Erin A. Post. Rethinking Marxism 10, no. 3 (1998): 22–
37.
Morfino, Vittorio. “An Althusserian Lexicon.” Translated by Jason Smith.
Borderlands 4, no. 2 (2005).
http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol4no2_2005/morfino_lexicon.htm
.
Moulier-Boutang, Yann. “L’interdit Biographique et L’autorisation de
L’oeuvre.” Futur Antérieur/L’Harmattan. Numéro Special : Lire
Althusser aujourd’hui (Avril 1997). http://www.multitudes.net/Linterdit-biographique-et-l/.
———. “Le Matérialisme Comme Politique Aléatoire.” Multitudes, no. 2
(2005): 159–65.
70
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

70

Lewis: Althusser’s Scientism and Aleatory Materialism

Navarro, Fernanda. “An Encounter with Althusser.” Rethinking Marxism 10,
no. 3 (1998): 93–98.
Negri, Antonio. “Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of Louis
Althusser.” In Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist Theory:
Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, edited by Antonio Callari and David
Ruccio, 51–68. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996.
Rancière, Jacques. “Sur La Théorie de L’idéologie Politique d’Althusser.” L
Homme et La Société 27, no. 1 (1973): 31–61.
doi:10.3406/homso.1973.1785.
Read, Jason. “To Think the New in the Absence of Its Conditions:
Althusser and Negri and the Philosophy of Primitive Accumulation.”
In Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical
Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Resch, Robert Paul. Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory. Berkeley
(Calif.): University of California Press, 1992.
Schöttler, Peter. “Scientisme Sur L’histoire D’un Concept Difficile.” Revue
Synthèse 134, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 89–113.
Solomon, Samuel. “L’espacement de La Lecture: Althusser, Derrida, and the
Theory of Reading.” Décalages 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2012).
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol1/iss2/4.
Sotiris, Panagiotis. “Contradictions of Aleatory Materialism: On Louis
Althusser’s Later Writings.” Accessed January 16, 2014.
http://www.after1968.org/app/webroot/uploads/Article-Sotiris.pdf.
———. “Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–1987.”
Historical Materialism 16, no. 3 (September 2008): 147–78.
doi:10.1163/156920608X315284.
Suchting, Wal. “Althusser’s Late Thinking about Materialism.” Historical
Materialism 12, no. 1 (2004): 3–70.
Thomas, Peter D. “Althusser’s Last Encounter: Gramsci.” In Encountering
Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical Thought. New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Toscano, Alberto. “Aleatory Rationalism.” In Badiou: Theoretical Writings,
edited by Alain Badiou, Ray Brassier, and Alberto Toscano, 260–74.
London: Continuum, 2004. http://research.gold.ac.uk/2240/.
Tosel, André. “Les Aléas Du Matérialisme Aléatoire Dans La Dernière
Philosophie de Louis Althusser.” Kouvélakis and Charbonier (eds.), 2005.
———. “The Hazards of Aleatory Materialism in the Late Philosophy of
Louis Althusser.” In Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in
Contemporary Radical Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Vatter, Miguel. “Althusser et Machiavel.” Multitudes no 13, no. 3 (August 1,
2003): 151–63. doi:10.3917/mult.013.0151.
Williams, Caroline. “Althusser and Spinoza: The Enigma of the Subject.” In
Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical
Thought. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
71
Published by OxyScholar, 2016

71

Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 22

Wilson, Sarah. The Visual World of French Theory: Figurations. New Haven
[Conn.]: Yale university press, 2010.
Wolin, Richard. The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural
Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s. Princeton University Press, 2012.

72
http://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/22

72

